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PREFACE 
 
The Department of Agricultural Economics (currently the Department of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics) initiated an annual outlook report for Wisconsin agriculture in 1987.  
Budget and staff constraints forced discontinuation of this series fo llowing the 1997 
Status of Wisconsin Agriculture.  The department is pleased to resume publication of 
Status with this 2001 edition. 
 
The report contains three parts.  Part I provides a brief overview of the financial 
environment in the Wisconsin farming sector.  In Part II, market analysts review current 
conditions in major Wisconsin commodity sub-sectors and offer their forecasts for 2001.  
Part III contains three special articles dealing with longer-term issues facing Wisconsin 
agriculture: potential changes in federal price and income support programs as related to 
macroeconomic conditions; implications for agriculture of the state’s new “smart growth” 
development strategy, and the declining contribution of agriculture to the overall 
Wisconsin economy. 
 
Additional copies of this report may be purchased for $5.00 each, including postage.  
Send requests to Ms. Linda Davis, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 
UW-Madison, 427 Lorch Street, Madison, WI  53706.  Copies may also be downloaded 
free from the Internet in either Adobe Acrobat® or MS-Word® format at 
http://www.aae.wisc.edu/www/pub/ 
 
The faculty of the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics welcomes your 
comments and questions on material in this report.  We also encourage your suggestions 
on rural Wisconsin issues that we might address in subsequent editions. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Put in the most direct terms, 2000 was a bad year for Wisconsin agriculture.  Dairy 
farmers, who contribute more than half of Wisconsin’s total farm cash receipts, 
experienced the lowest prices in more than 20 years.  The all-milk price for the year was 
more than $2 per hundredweight under 1999 and almost $4 less than 1998.  Wisconsin 
milk checks in 2000 were a half billion dollars lighter than in 1999, causing major belt-
tightening in all cases and negative cash flows in many.  Changes in federal milk 
marketing orders that took place on January 1, 2000, exacerbated the price situation by 
partially insulating some regions of the country from lower prices and thus impeding 
necessary supply adjustments. 
 
The new year will bring some improvement in milk prices, as supply moves into better 
balance with demand later in the year.  The 2001 all-milk price in Wisconsin is expected 
to be about $1 per hundredweight higher than 2000. 
 
The price and income situation for other Wisconsin commodities in 2000 was mixed.  
Cranberry growers fared much worse than dairy farmers.  Season average prices for the 
crop year will likely end up around $15 per barrel (100 pounds), yielding Wisconsin 
growers about $40 million compared to $160 million just three years ago.  Oppressive 
cranberry inventories should be reduced in 2001 as low prices stimulate consumption and 
marketing order restrictions cut supply. 
 
Corn and soybean growers will likely see average prices for the 2000 crop about the same 
as last year, around $1.80 per bushel for corn and $4.65 for beans.  These prices are 30 
percent to 35 percent below those experienced during 1995-97.  But low prices for corn 
and beans are being offset by large government direct payments in the form of transition 
payments, loan deficiency payments, and market loss assistance.  For all U.S. growers in 
FY2000, USDA estimates these payments will total $9.7 billion for corn and $2.7 billion 
for soybeans, about $1 per bushel.  For the 2001 crop year, high fertilizer costs, 
especially nitrogen, will favor soybeans over corn in much of the country.  This will 
likely strengthen market prices for corn and weaken the bean market.  USDA is 
forecasting a substantial reduction in direct payments to crop producers, but Congress is 
renown for upsetting USDA farm price and income support projections. 
 
Livestock producers fared better in 2000 than in recent years.  Choice steer prices 
averaged almost $4 per hundredweight over 1999, and barrows and gilts traded more than 
$10 per hundredweight higher.  Poultry and egg prices were mostly on par with 1999.  
For 2001, cattle prices will likely be $3-$8 higher, hog prices will slip $1-$4, and poultry 
products are all expected to show slightly lower prices. 
 v 
The overall financial condition of Wisconsin farms is strong but deteriorating.  Fueled by 
a buoyant state economy, farmland values have strengthened.  The Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago recently reported an 8 percent increase in the value of “good” farmland in 
Wisconsin between October 1999 and October 2000.  This has buttressed farm balance 
sheets, helping to maintain reasonably strong equity positions despite depressed farm 
income.  But negative cash flows are likely eroding equity faster than higher land values 
are building it. 
 
 
………….. 
 
 
The three special articles in this year’s report address diverse long-term issues affecting 
Wisconsin agriculture.  William Dobson reviews the macroeconomic environment and 
speculates on how the end of the “Goldilocks” U.S. economy” will affect the new farm 
bill that will be debated in 2001.  Douglas Jackson-Smith examines Wisconsin’s new 
Smart Growth Law within the context of land use planning in rural communities.  Steven 
Deller and Bruce Jones look at the relative contribution of farming and food processing to 
the Wisconsin economy, documenting that farming is not sharing in the economic boom 
enjoyed by other sectors
 
 
 
I. Financial Situation in the Wisconsin Farm Economy 
Bruce Jones 
(608) 265-8508 
 
 
 
The question most asked about the 
Wisconsin farm economy is, “Are 
Wisconsin farmers facing a repeat of the 
mid-1980’s financial crisis?”  Honest 
answers to this important question are, “It’s 
not clear,” and “It’s too soon to say.” 
 
There are disturbing signs of an impending 
crisis.  Wisconsin farmers rely on milk sales 
for more than half of cash receipts.  Milk 
prices crashed in late 1999, and have yet to 
recover.  Many of the state’s dairy farmers 
experienced negative cash flows throughout 
2000, and nearly all dairy farmers have 
tightened the belt several notches, delaying 
major purchases and shelving expansion 
plans.  Anecdotal evidence indicates 
accounts receivable in the dairy farm supply 
sector are ballooning. 
 
The income situation for other commodities 
is mixed but not especially encouraging 
overall.  Hog prices have recovered from 
devastating levels in 1998 and 1999 and 
cattle prices are showing strength relative to 
the mid-1990’s.  Corn and soybean prices 
remain very low by historical standards, but 
government payments have offset some 
market losses.  Cranberry growers have seen 
two years of prices well below production 
costs. 
 
At the same time, the balance sheet for 
Wisconsin farms is relatively strong in 
comparison to the mid 1980’s.  Land values 
are not declining, providing an equity 
cushion that did not exist 15 years ago.  
Debt-asset ratios are much more favorable, 
at least at the moment. 
 
It may be too soon to say there is a financial 
crisis in Wisconsin agriculture.  However, 
that is of little solace to the farmer with his 
back against the wall or the feed dealer who 
has to tell that farmer that his terms of credit 
have become cash and carry.  Clearly, more 
and more farmers in Wisconsin are 
experiencing financial stress, and the 
numbers could expand rapidly if milk prices 
are slow to recover. 
 
 Assets and Debts 
 
Figure 1 shows that between 1960 and 1998 
the value of farm assets rose from roughly 
$5 billion to nearly $27 billion while farm 
debts grew from approximately $500 million 
to roughly $5 billion. The net result of these 
increases in farm asset values and debts was 
a net worth or wealth gain of roughly $22 
billion for Wisconsin farmers. These gains 
in net worth, which are largely the result of 
real estate appreciation, have kept the 
balance sheet for the Wisconsin farming 
sector strong even though farm incomes 
have been depressed. 
 
As of 1998 Wisconsin farms had only 22 
cents of debt per $1 of farm assets.  This 
debt-to-asset ratio for the farm sector is well 
below the .70 value that lenders typically set 
as the upper limit for farm borrowers. This 
low debt-to-asset ratio for the farm sector is 
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evidence that the balance sheet position for 
the farm sector is relatively strong. 
 
Income and Expenses 
 
The farm income measures presented in 
Figure 2 show that the total incomes of 
Wisconsin farmers have been rising while 
net incomes have been either holding steady 
or falling.  This decline in net farm incomes 
that has been occurring over the last decade 
is why we have continued to see a steady 
decline in the number farms in the state. 
 
The fact that net farm incomes have not 
risen along with total farm incomes is 
evidence that farmers’ profit margins have 
been eroded over time.  This decline in 
profit margins, which is typically identified 
as one of the characteristics of highly 
competitive markets, is evidence that 
farmers are being squeezed by low 
commodity prices and high production costs.  
 
Figure 2 shows that in the last half of the 
1980s net farm incomes rose before they 
started to descend in the 1990s.  This 
increase in net farm incomes in the late 
1980s was largely the result of federal farm 
programs that paid substantial sums of 
money to Wisconsin farmers in the form of 
price supports and other subsidies.  Without 
these government payments net farm 
incomes would not have risen in the 1980s. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates how important 
government payments have been to 
Wisconsin farmers the last couple of 
decades.  During the 1985 to 1989 period, 
government payments represented 10 to 17 
percent of farmers’ total income in any 
given year.   Throughout most of the 1990s, 
government payments comprised less than 
10 percent of farmers’ total income.  This 
cut back in government payments for 
farmers explains why farm net incomes have 
been trending downward over the last 
decade or so. 
 
Government payments as a percent of total 
farm income in 1999 is now back up to the 
level it was in the late 1980s.  This occurred 
because farmer again received payments 
from the government that were intended to 
offset the negative effects low commodity 
prices were having on farmers’ net incomes.  
Similar levels of government payments, 
primarily in the form of emergency 
payments were made to farmers in 2000.  It 
is uncertain at this time if farmers will 
continue to receive income supports from 
the government in 2001 and future years. 
 
Relative Debt Positions of Wisconsin 
Farmers 
 
Two financial measures are presented in 
Figure 4 that reflect the relative debt 
positions of Wisconsin farmers.  One 
measure is the net- income-to-debt ratio, 
which reflects the amount of net income 
Wisconsin farmers earn per dollar of debt.  
The other measure is the ratio of assets-to-
debts, which indicates the value of assets 
farmers have per dollar of debt.  High values 
for these two ratios indicate the farm 
economy is strong while low values are 
signs that the farm economies financial 
position is relatively weak. 
 
Figure 4 shows that the farm economy’s 
financial strength has declined over the last 
four decades.  The farm sector’s asset-to-
debt position has declined at a modest rate 
indicating that farmers are borrowing more 
money relative to the value of their assets.  
More alarming is the dramatic decline in the 
farm sectors net- income-to-debt positions.  
Over time farmers’ use of credit has 
increased dramatically relative to net farm 
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income.  This latter trend is a cause for some 
concern because it indicates that farmers’ 
ability to service their debt commitments is 
declining.  This downtrend in the net income 
to debt ratio cannot continue indefinitely.  
Lenders will not loan increased amounts of 
money to farmers if farm incomes do not 
rise to levels that allow farmers to retire 
debts to in an orderly and timely manner. 
If lenders start clamping down on new loans 
to farm borrowers, farmers may have to start 
liquidating land and other assets to repay 
their existing debts or get the money to fund 
their day to day operations.  This liquidation 
of farm assets will solve farmers’ short run 
capital problems but it will further erode the 
state’s farm economy, and force even more 
farmers to leave the industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Wisconsin Farm Assets and Debts
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Figure 2: Wisconsin Farm Income
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Figure 3: Government Payments as a Percent of U.S. Total Farm 
Income
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Figure 4: Debt Ratios for Wisconsin Farms
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II. Current Outlook for Wisconsin Agricultural Commodities and 
Inputs 
 
In this section, marketing and farm management specialists in the Department of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics provide their insights on economic conditions for 
Wisconsin agriculture by commodity sub-sector.  Interested readers are encouraged to 
contact the authors for more current or more detailed information 
 
 
 
 
Dairy Situation and Outlook 
Bob Cropp 
(608) 262-9483 
 
Dairy farmers experienced record high 
milk prices in 1998 and relatively strong 
milk prices for 1999.  In contrast, 2000 
saw very depressed prices throughout 
the entire year (Table 1).  For the first 
six months, the Class III price averaged 
below $10 per hundredweight and only 
slightly above $10 for the second six 
months.  The average Class III price for 
2000 is estimated at $9.73 per 
hundredweight, $2.70 lower than the 
comparable Basic Formula Price (BFP) 
in 1999 and $4.47 lower than the record 
BFP set in 1998. The average all-milk 
Table 1: BFP/Class III & Average All-milk Prices, Wisconsin and U.S., 1998- 2000 
and Forecast for 2001 (Dollars Per Hundredweight) * 
 
Month 
 
1998 
BFP 
 
1999 
BFP 
 
2000 
Class III 
 
2001  
Class III 
Jan 13.25 16.27 10.05 9.50 
Feb 13.32 10.27 9.54 9.70 
Mar 12.81 11.62 9.54 9.60 
Apr 12.01 11.81 9.41 9.70 
May 10.88 11.26 9.37 9.95 
Jun 13.10 11.42 9.46 10.25 
Jul 14.77 13.59 10.66 10.90 
Aug 14.99 15.79 10.13 11.30 
Sep 15.10 16.26 10.76 11.85 
Oct 16.04 11.49 10.02 11.90 
Nov 16.84 9.79 8.57 11.50 
Dec 17.34 9.63 9.30** 11.30 
Average BFP/Class III 14.20 12.43 9.73 10.62 
Average WI All-milk Price 15.50 13.86 11.58 12.40 
Average U.S. All-milk Price 15.50 14.36 12.30 13.10 
*  The BFP was replaced by the Class III price in 2000 
** Estimated 
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price to Wisconsin dairy farmers is 
estimated to be $11.58 per 
hundredweight for 2000, compared to 
$13.86 for 1999 and a record $15.50 in 
1998.  
 
In 2000, milk prices fell to levels not 
seen since 1978.  Prices for year 2001 
are forecast to recover slowly, with an 
average Class III price of $10.62 per 
hundredweight and an average all-milk 
price of $12.40 for Wisconsin. While 
these prices are still low, this is a more 
optimistic forecast than what others have 
predicted and higher than current Class 
III futures market prices.  
 
Why did milk prices collapse in the last 
quarter of 1999 and stay down through 
2000 and into 2001?  Record high milk 
prices in 1998 and continued strong 
prices in 1999 along with relatively 
cheap feed encouraged dairy expansions, 
particularly in western states.  Milk cow 
numbers normally decline each year, but 
this did not happen in 1999 or 2000 
(Figure 5).  Cow numbers increased only 
slightly in 1999, from an average of 9.15 
million head to 9.16 million head.  The 
increase was 0.7 percent in 2000, to an 
average of 9.22 million head1.  Cow 
numbers increased each month during 
2000.  
 
This was not the case for Wisconsin and 
Minnesota. Cow numbers declined about 
0.7 percent in Wisconsin and 2.5 percent 
in Minnesota for a total loss of about 
25,000 cows.  But due to expansions in 
the West, California, Washington, Idaho, 
Arizona and New Mexico had a 
                                                 
1 This  outlook was written prior to final 2000 
production numbers released by USDA. Final 
numbers are likely to be different from what are 
reported here. 
combined total of about 128,000 more 
cows than a year ago.  
 
With low milk prices, we expect dairy 
expansions to slow and milk cow 
numbers not to increase in 2001.  The 
average number of cows for 2001 is 
forecast to stay the same at 9.22 million 
head.   
 
Cheap feed and favorable weather 
during most of 1999 and 2000 resulted 
in excellent milk production per cow 
(Figure 6). While milk prices have been 
low, the milk-feed-price ratio 2 remained 
relatively strong (Figure 7). A ratio of 
3.0 or above favors herd expansion.  
U.S. milk per cow averaged 17,771 for 
1999, an increase of 3.4 percent over 
1998, and milk per cow increased to 
18,286 for 2000, another 2.9 percent 
increase.  Increases in milk per cow may 
slow some in 2001, but an increase of at 
least 2.1 percent to 18,670 pounds 
appears reasonable.  
 
Total milk production for 2000 increased 
3.6 percent to 168.6 billion pounds 
(Figure 8).  With no change in milk cow 
numbers and an increase in milk per cow 
of 2.1 percent, we can expect about 
172.1 billion pounds of milk for 2001.  
 
With increases in milk production, the 
production of dairy products is also 
higher.  From January through October 
2000, as compared to a year earlier, the 
production of cheese was up 5.3 percent, 
butter production up 2.9 percent and 
nonfat dry milk production up 8.4 
percent.  
 
                                                 
2 The number pounds of 16% mixed dairy feed 
equal in value to one pound of whole milk. The 
feed includes alfalfa hay, corn and soybeans. 
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A strong economy has kept commercial 
disappearance strong. Commercial 
disappearance increased 3.1 percent to 
164.9 billion pounds in 1999, and for 
2000 commercial disappearance may 
total near 169.8 billion pounds, an 
increase of more than 2.5 percent. 
Compared to a year ago, commercial 
disappearance for the period of January 
through September was up 2.0 percent 
for American cheese, 7.4 percent for 
other types of cheese, unchanged for 
butter, down 5.2 percent for nonfat dry 
milk, down 0.7 percent for fluid 
(beverage) milk and up 2.8 percent for 
all dairy products on a milkfat equivalent 
basis. Commercial disappearance is 
expected to grow another 2.5 percent 
during 2001 and reach a total of 174 
billion pounds. 
 
While commercial disappearance has 
been strong, the increase in milk and 
dairy product production was greater. 
The result was a build-up in dairy stocks.  
Total cheese stocks as of October 30th, 
were 9 percent higher than a year ago 
(Figure 9), and nonfat dry milk stocks 
were more than double.  Butter stocks 
were 10 percent lower, but had been 
higher earlier in the year (Figure 10).  
These stocks are well above the 5-year 
average. Not until stocks are reduced, 
particularly stocks of cheese, will farm 
level milk prices improve. With the 
increase in milk production slowing 
during 2001 and continued growth in 
commercial disappearance, stocks 
should decline slowly and add some 
strength to 2001 milk prices. 
 
With the depressed milk prices, CCC 
removals under the dairy price support 
program are estimated to total about 8.0 
billion pounds (skim milk equivalent) in 
2000, up from the 6.5 billion pounds in 
1999 and 4.0 billion pounds in 1998.  
This increase was mostly due to major 
increases in CCC purchases of nonfat 
dry milk and some cheese purchases for 
the last quarter of 2000. CCC purchases 
probably will decline only slightly in 
2001 since nonfat dry milk prices will 
remain at support levels. 
 
Dairy imports and exports have little 
impact on milk prices since on a total 
solids milk equivalent basis imports 
closely match exports. The concern with 
imports is the growing and unrestricted 
imports of ultra milk proteins. These are 
likely replacing some of the use of 
domestic nonfat dry milk and adding to 
CCC purchases of nonfat dry milk under 
the support program. 
 
Table 2 summarizes changes in the dairy 
supply and demand situation3:  Milk 
production estimates shown for 2001 can 
easily change. Milk cow numbers could 
decline rather than remain unchanged. 
Weather can significantly impact milk 
per cow. But with the information now 
available these estimates are reasonable. 
If milk production does turn out lower, 
then the forecasted milk prices for the 
second half of 2001 will be higher. It 
will be important for dairy producers to 
watch market developments. If market 
prices show more strength, producers 
may wish to protect better prices with 
price risk management tools, whether it 
be cash forward contracts with a milk 
buyer, hedging on the futures market, 
buying a put option, or some 
combination. 
 
No major changes in federal dairy policy 
are expected before 2002, when a new 
farm bill will be written. But some 
                                                 
3 Data for this table and in the report are drawn 
from USDA, NASS reports. 
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intervening changes could affect milk 
prices in 2001.  
 
The federal order reform that was 
implemented January 1, 2000, had a 
significant impact on milk prices and 
milk production in 2000. The Basic 
Formula Price (BFP) as a mover of Class 
I milk prices was replaced by the higher 
of an advanced Class IV skim milk price 
(milk used for nonfat dry milk) or 
advanced Class III skim milk price (milk 
used for cheese).  These class skim milk 
prices are derived from component 
pricing formulas.  During most of 2000, 
cheese prices were depressed because of 
surplus milk production.  Nonfat dry 
milk prices, supported at a relatively 
high level, were close to CCC purchase 
prices.  But butter prices were well 
above support, which caused the   
formulas to yield higher advanced Class 
IV skim milk prices than advanced Class 
III skim milk prices. On average for 
year, the Class IV skim milk value was 
$1.80 per hundredweight higher than the 
Class III value, with the difference as 
great as $3.61 for December.  
 
This increased the effective Class I 
differential as measured by the 
difference between the Class I and Class 
III prices. The Class I market was 
isolated from the low cheese prices 
caused by surplus milk production. 
Dairy producers in markets where milk 
is used predominately for cheese – in 
particular Wisconsin and Minnesota  
received low cheese milk prices.  
Producers in Class I (beverage) markets 
were partially insulated from the surplus 
milk situation. As can be seen in Table 
Table 2:  Milk Supply and Demand Summary 
 
Item 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 Est 
 
2001 Est 
Milk Cows –000- 9,154 9,156 9,220 9220 
Milk/cow 17,189 17,771 18,286 18,670 
Total Milk-B Lbs. 157.3 162.7 168.6 172.1 
Marketings- B Lbs. 156.1 161.3 167.2 170.7 
Beg. Stocks- B Lbs 4.9 5.3 6.1 7.2 
Imports- B Lbs. 4.6 4.8 4.5 4.5 
Total Supply- B Lbs. 165.6 171.4 177.8 182.4 
End Stocks- B Lbs. 5.3 6.1 7.2 6.4 
Net removals- B Lbs. 0.4 
(4.0 skim) 
0.3 
(6.5 skim) 
0.8 
(8.0 skim) 
2.0 
(7.5 skim) 
Commercial 
Disappearance 
159.9 
(156.0) 
164.9 
(157.8) 
169.8 
(161.7) 
174.0 
(166.5) 
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1, the decline in the U.S all-milk price in 
2000 from 1999 was not as great as the 
decline in the Class III price or the 
decline in the Wisconsin average all-
milk price. This has delayed the 
reduction in milk production needed to 
improve milk prices. 
 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Glickman 
was instructed by Congress to review the 
Class IV and Class III formulas and 
implement any changes by January 1, 
2001.  On December 1st, the Secretary 
did just that with a tentative final 
decision to amend the formulas.  These 
changes were approved by a producer 
referendum in December and 
implemented on January 1, 2000.  The 
industry has until February 5 to 
comment on the changes.  The Secretary 
will subsequently issue a final decision 
that producers must also approve via 
referendum.  
 
The changes in the tentative final 
decision do not address the “higher of” 
problem discussed above. In fact, the 
decision virtually ensures that the 
advanced Class IV 3.5 percent butterfat 
milk price will be the mover of Class I, 
thus effectively de-coupling Class I 
prices from cheese prices. 
 
For the past two years the only dairy 
product that has been in surplus has been 
nonfat dry milk. Nonfat dry milk has 
been near the support price of $1.01 per 
pound non-fortified or $1.02 per pound 
fortified (Figure 11). Butter prices have 
been well above the $0.668 per pound 
support price. Except for the last quarter 
of 2000, 40-pound cheddar cheese 
blocks have been above the $1.122 per 
pound support price. The cost of the 
dairy price support program has 
increased because of growing purchases 
of surplus nonfat dry milk. Since the 
beginning of the fiscal year, October 1, 
2000, through early December 2000, 
CCC purchases of nonfat dry milk were 
5 times greater than for the same period 
a year earlier.  
 
The U.S Secretary of Agriculture has the 
authority and the responsibility to 
minimize the cost of the dairy price 
support program by “tilting” the CCC 
purchase support price away from nonfat 
dry milk (lower price) to butter (higher 
price).  Lower prices for nonfat dry milk 
would reduce the advanced Class IV 
milk price under the current formulas 
and the formulas included in the 
tentative final decision. Resulting lower 
Class I milk prices would encourage a 
greater slow-down in milk production 
and a quicker strengthening of milk 
prices nationally. But, as of now, dairy 
producers need to make decisions based 
on milk prices like those forecasted 
above. 
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Figure 6: Milk per Cow, 20 States, 1999-2000
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Figure 5: Milk Cow Numbers, 20 States, 1999-2000
7,600
7,650
7,700
7,750
7,800
7,850
7,900
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1999
2000
 12
Figure 7: Milk-Feed Price Ratio, 1999-2000
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Figure 8: Total U.S. Milk Production, 1999-2000
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Figure 9: End-of-Month American Cheese Stocks, 1999-2000
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Figure 10: End-of-Month Butter Stocks, 1999-2000
0.000
20.000
40.000
60.000
80.000
100.000
120.000
140.000
160.000
Jan Feb March April  May June July August Sept Oct Nov Dec
1,
00
0 
P
ou
n
d
s
1999
2000
 14
 
Livestock and Poultry Outlook 
Patrick Luby 
(608) 262-6074 
 
Overview 
 
U.S. meat production has increased for 
each of the last 18 years and is likely to 
post another modest gain in 2001.  The 
decade-long moderate rise in beef 
production may end in 2001 with a mild 
decline in beef output.  Following a 
small reduction in 2000, pork production 
should edge upward in 2001.  Pork 
production has not experienced 
back-to-back annual declines since the 
economic recession years of 1981 and 
1982.  Broiler output, up every year in 
the last four decades except one (1973), 
should record another modest gain in 
2001.  Turkey production, up every year 
since 1982 except one (1998), should 
also post a moderate increase in the new 
year. 
 
Domestic meat demand, helped by 
record employment and consumer 
incomes, has been strong and led to a 
moderate rise in retail meat prices during 
the past year.  A slowing economy and 
rising energy costs may blunt demand 
growth in 2001 but retail meat prices are 
likely to again show a moderate rise. 
 
An impressive decade- long increase in 
meat exports has stalled and leveled off 
during the last several years.  This 
slowing of exports has occurred because 
of economic disruptions in various 
importing countries and a strong and 
rising dollar.  Net exports are likely to 
continue to trend sidewise in 2001. 
Figure 11: CME Monthly Average Dairy Product Prices, 1999-2000
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Record U.S. corn and soybean crops in 
2000 provide a favorable base for 
continued expansion of meat production 
during the next year or two.  However, 
strong demand for grain and meal may 
cause feed prices to rise from the very 
low levels of the past two or three years.  
Other developments, such as food safety 
concerns, genetically modified 
organisms in crops, mad cow disease in 
parts of Europe and the potential 
elimination of bone meal in animal feed 
may become very important 
considerations in the financial results of 
the livestock and poultry industries in 
2001. 
 
Meat Production Continues to Set New 
Record Highs 
 
Meat production in the U.S. increased 
during 2000 for the 18th consecutive 
year.  Meat production increased about  
1 percent in 2000, less than the average 
2.7 percent annual increases during the 
previous 17 years.  Beef, broilers and 
turkey recorded modest production gains 
in 2000 while pork output declined about 
2 percent. 
 
During the last 18 years, total meat 
output has risen about 58 percent.  
Broiler output rose 151 percent from 
1982 to 2000 while turkey production 
climbed 120 percent, pork production 
increased 34 percent and beef output 
rose 20 percent.  The increase in broiler 
production accounted for nearly  
60 percent of the total gain in meat 
production and the increase in combined 
broiler and turkey output accounted for 
nearly 70 percent of the total increase 
from 1982 to 2000. 
 
Improvements in management, genetics, 
housing and nutrition in the production 
of poultry and livestock on farms and 
ranches have contributed to these 
production increases. Favorable weather 
during the last several years has also 
helped.  Large corn and soybean crops, 
moderate summers and mild winters 
have all been favorable for producing 
livestock and poultry.  Stronger 
consumer demand for poultry, and in 
particular for broilers, has directed a 
larger proportion of the resources into 
poultry production relative to beef and 
pork during the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
 
Average slaughter weights of animals 
and birds in 2000 were much higher than 
in 1982 and have been a large factor in 
the increase in meat production.  The 
average weight of broilers slaughtered in 
2000 was up over 20 percent since 1982.  
The average weight of turkeys 
slaughtered increased 32 percent in the 
last 18 years. 
 
Average weights of cattle and hogs have 
also increased.  The average dressed 
weight of steers increased 14 percent 
from 1982 to 2000 while the average 
dressed weight of heifers rose 21 
percent.  The average dressed weight of 
hogs rose 13 percent despite the smaller 
proportion of heavier weight sows in the 
total slaughter. 
 
The increase in average weights has had 
positive effects on efficiencies of 
production and marketing.  The need for 
animal housing, slaughtering, breaking 
and boning facilities as well as other 
production inputs has not risen as fast as 
the increases in total meat production as 
a result of the ability to feed to heavier 
weights while still maintaining or 
improving the quality of the meat 
produced. 
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Export Boom Has Leveled Off 
 
The decade long rise in exports of most 
meats that began in the mid-1980’s has 
leveled off during the last several years 
(Figure 12).  Spurred by severe 
economic problems in the first half of 
the 1980’s, the livestock and meat 
industry aggressively financed the 
promotion of its products in international 
markets.  A weakening dollar and 
rapidly growing economies, particularly 
in Southeast Asia, and an improving 
quality of U.S. produced meat helped in 
the success of the marketing effort.  
However, in the last several years, a 
slowdown in certain markets, 
particularly in Southeast Asia and 
Russia, along with a strengthening 
dollar, have slowed the export growth. 
 
Meat Consumption Per Capita in 2000 
Nearly Matches 1999 Record 
 
The all time record high of 220.4 pounds 
of meat consumed per capita in the U.S. 
in 1999 was nearly matched in 2000.  
Consumption per person of beef was up 
slightly, pork consumption was down a 
bit while poultry consumption per 
person was little changed. 
 
During the last decade, per capita 
consumption of beef, pork and turkey 
has trended sidewise while rising broiler 
consumption has accounted for 
practically all of the gain in the rise in 
total meat consumed per person. 
 
Beef consumption per person, which 
peaked at 94.4 pounds in 1976, has been 
in a narrow range of 65 to 69 pounds for 
the last 12 years.  Pork consumption per 
person has also trended sidewise 
between 48 and 54 pound for the last 19 
years.  A high of 60.6 pounds had been 
reached in 1971.  Turkey consumption 
per capita has been flat since 1990 with a 
range of 17.6 to 18.5 pounds each year, 
up from 11.0 pounds in 1984 and only 
4.5 pounds in 1965.  However, broiler 
consumption has continued to rise to a 
new high of about 77 pounds in 1999 
and 2000, up from 48.3 pounds in 1983 
and only 23.5 pounds in 1960. 
 
Beef Production May Turn Down in 
2001 
 
Beef production rose about 18 percent 
from the cyclical low in 1990 to 2000.  
Nearly half of that increase resulted from 
the rise in average weights of animals at 
slaughter.  The beef production cycle 
usually follows the cattle numbers cycle 
by several years and the number of cattle 
and calves on farms and ranches peaked 
at 103.5 million head in 1996 and fell to 
99.0 million head in 2000.  A further 
small decline is expected in 2001. 
 
Slowly rising cattle slaughter and a 
decline in the U.S. calf drop, down from 
40.2 million in 1995 to 38.7 million in 
2000, has cut into total cattle numbers 
and should lead to reduced cattle 
slaughter for the next several years, 
beginning in 2001.  The downward 
phase of the production cycle is not 
expected to last more than several years 
but should support a rise in cattle prices 
during that time. 
 
Choice cattle prices are cyclical and 
averaged $75.37 per live cwt. for the six 
years from 1988 through 1993.  
However, during the last seven years 
from 1994 through 2000, they averaged 
only about $66.25, reaching a low of 
$61.75 in 1998 (Figure 14).  They rose 
to nearly $66.00 in 1999 and to about 
$69.00 in 2000.  They should average 
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above $70 in 2001 as they did in each of 
the six years from 1988 through 1993. 
 
Feeder Cattle Prices Strong 
 
Feeder cattle prices have been strong in 
2000 and should continue strong in 2001 
and for several years beyond if feed 
prices remain moderate.  In April 1995, 
feeder cattle (750-800 lbs., Oklahoma 
City) reached a low of $53.10 under the 
weight of low and falling choice cattle 
prices and very high and rising corn 
prices that reached a record all time high 
one month later.  The April 1995 low in 
feeder cattle prices was the lowest in 17 
years. 
 
Feeder cattle prices in 2000 averaged 
about $86, nearly $10 higher than in 
1999, and much higher than the cyclical 
low of $61.08 in 1996.  The 2000 price 
average threatened the record high of 
$88.27 in 1990 and subsequent highs of 
$88 in 1991 and $86.45 in 1993.  Driven 
by stronger choice cattle prices and 
moderate feed prices, feeder cattle prices 
should rise again in 2001 and should 
exceed the record high set in 1990. 
 
Cow Slaughter Low, Prices Up 
 
Federally Inspected cow slaughter of 
about 5.4 million head in 2000 was the 
lowest since a similar number in 1972 
and 1970 and otherwise the lowest since 
1964.  Cow slaughter reached a cyclical 
high in 1996 during the year of record 
high corn prices and has fallen  
24 percent in the last four years.  During 
that time, dairy cow slaughter fell  
14 percent and beef cow slaughter 
declined 32 percent.  Cow slaughter 
should decline a little more in 2001 as 
the cow and calf industry attempts to 
produce a few more highly valued 
calves. 
 
Cow prices (Boning Utility, Sioux Falls) 
have strengthened from their cyclical 
low of just over $30 in 1996, the lowest 
average annual price since 1977 to about 
$42 in 2000.  A further moderate rise is 
likely in 2001 as slaughter numbers 
retreat toward their cyclical low. 
 
Pork Production to Increase Slowly 
 
Pork production declined about  
2 percent in 2000 following two years of 
poor financial results.  A huge increase 
in pork production in 1998 led to very 
low hog prices in late 1998 and into 
1999.  Total pork output increased  
1.7 billion pounds in 1998 over 1997, 
more than the total increase of  
1.6 billion pounds that took place during 
the preceding eight years from 1989 to 
1997.  The mild decline in pork output 
that began in late 1999 should continue 
into early 2001 and then be followed by 
a modest increase.  A rise of 2 to 3 
percent is expected for the calendar year. 
 
The hog-pork industry has enjoyed 
excellent weather for production 
increases during the past several years  
mild winters, moderate summer 
temperatures, good crops and resulting 
low feed prices.  Unfavorable weather in 
2001 would make production increases 
more difficult.  Pork production has not 
declined for two consecutive calendar 
years since 1980-1982. 
 
Hog prices averaged about $32 per live 
cwt. in 1998 and $34 in 1999, the lowest 
annual averages since 1972.  Even 
considering the vast improvements in 
production efficiencies and the relatively 
low feed costs, most producers 
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experienced very difficult financial 
times.  However, hog prices averaged 
nearly $45.00 in 2000 and were 
apparently high enough to stem the 
production decline. 
 
In the USDA quarterly survey of hog 
producers on September 1, producers 
said they intended to increase autumn 
(September-November) farrowings by  
1 percent and winter (December -
February) farrowings by 3 percent.  This 
would indicate, given normal weather, 
that pork production would begin to 
exceed year ago levels by the second 
quarter of 2001.  It would also indicate 
that any production increase in 2001 
would be of modest proportions. 
 
The anticipated cut back in beef output 
in 2001 should help pork demand and 
unless the general economy falls into a 
recession, average hog prices in 2001 
should be near those of 2000, in the low 
to mid-40’s. 
 
The structure and location of the hog 
production industry changed rapidly 
during the 1990’s as the number of 
producers declined and the average size 
increased.  The proportion of hogs raised 
in the traditional Mid-West Corn Belt 
declined as significant increases 
occurred elsewhere, most notably in 
North Carolina.  While these trends may 
continue in the new decade, it appears 
that the momentum of change is 
slowing. 
 
Broiler Production Increase Slowing 
 
Broiler output set a new record high in 
2000 for the 26th consecutive year but 
the increase of a little over 1 percent was 
the smallest in 18 years and far below 
the average annual increase of 5.6 
percent achieved from 1984 through 
1999.  The nearly 7 percent increase in 
broiler production in 1999, a record 
annual increase of 1.9 billion pounds, a 
larger one year increase than the huge 
increase in pork production in 1998, 
caused prices to decline and resulted in 
disappointing financial returns in both 
1999 and 2000.  A more difficult export 
environment during the last several years 
also contributed to the lower prices and 
declining financial returns. 
 
The explosive demand growth for broiler 
meat over the years has resulted in a 
very large industry where percentage 
increases achieved in the past are 
probably less likely in the future because 
they result in huge poundage increases, 
too large for the domestic demand to 
absorb.  Unless export growth returns to 
the pre-1997 levels, the broiler industry 
will likely have to be content with a 
smaller annual percentage growth than it 
enjoyed in the past. 
 
Helped by one additional weekday in 
2001 compared with 2000 (2000 had one 
less weekday than 1999), broiler output 
should again slowly expand by  
2 to 3 percent in 2001.  Along with less 
competition from the beef industry, this 
should permit better financial results 
than the broiler industry has experienced 
during the past two years. 
 
Turkey Expansion Continues To Be 
Moderate 
 
Turkey production, after exploding in 
the late 1980’s, and growing in the early 
1990’s, declined in the late 1990's for 
the first time in years.  Turkey output 
rose 77 percent in the six years form 
1984 to 1990, then rose another  
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20 percent during the next six years to 
1996.  However, the pace of production 
outran the pace of demand, causing 
frozen inventories of turkey to rise to 
record large levels, prices to tumble and 
financial results to deteriorate.  As a 
result, production in 1999 fell 3 percent 
below that of 1996, unheard of in the 
industry in recent decades. 
 
With the three-year cutback in 
production, frozen inventories were 
reduced to the lowest levels in more than 
a decade and with the help of low feed 
costs, profitability returned to the 
industry.  A moderate production 
increase of about 2 percent took place in 
2000 and a rise of about 3 percent is 
expected in 2001. 
 
The average price of whole turkey hens 
in 2000 was the highest in 14 years and 
the highest ever except for the three-year 
period from 1984 through 1986. 
However, prices for most of the turkey 
parts such as breastmeat, thighmeat, 
wings, drums and mechanically 
separated turkey meat were well below 
their previous highs.  Average prices in 
2001 should be near those of 2000 and 
should feed costs remain moderate, the 
industry should be able to avoid the 
financial problems of the mid and late 
1990’s. 
 
Egg Production, Prices Steady In 2001 
 
Egg output has witnessed a moderate, 
steady rise since the industry's last 
annual production downturn in 1989.  
However, the increase in recent years, up 
10 percent from 1996 to 2000, caused 
wholesale egg prices to tumble 26 
percent from their high in 1996, when 
feed prices were very high, to 2000 
when, fortunately for the industry, feed 
prices were low. 
 
Egg production rose about 2 percent 
from 1999 to 2000.  Another rise of 
about 1 percent is expected in 2001.  
Wholesale egg prices in 2000 have been 
about unchanged from a year earlier. 
Again, little change in the annual 
average prices for eggs is expected in 
2001. 
 
Retail Meat Prices Higher in 2000; 
Further Rise Expected in 2001 
 
The record high employment and 
consumer income in 2000, along with 
only a modest increase in meat 
production, resulted in a faster rise in 
retail meat prices in 2000 after nearly a 
decade of mostly small increases.  In the 
inflationary years of 1987 to 1991, retail 
meat prices rose at nearly the 5.0 percent 
annual average rate of the increase in the 
total Consumer Price Index (CPI).  In the 
following disinflationary eight years 
from 1991 to 1999, retail meat prices 
rose less than the 2.6 percent average 
annual rise in the CPI. Inflation, as 
measured by the CPI, rose about 3.4 
percent in 2000 and meat prices rose at 
an even faster rate. (Table 3) 
 
Table 3: Annual Average Percentage 
Change in Retail Meat Prices and 
Consumer Price Index 
 
 1987-
91 
1991-
99 
1999-
2000p 
Beef & Veal 5.7 0.6 6.3 
Pork 3.9 1.2 7.5 
Poultry 4.1 2.4 4.1 
Red Meat 4.9 0.9 6.0 
CPI 5.0 2.6 3.4 
p=Preliminary 
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Retail meat prices tend to rise unevenly 
from year to year. Retail poultry prices 
declined 1 percent from 1989 to 1992, 
then surged 19 percent during the 
following five years before rising only 3 
percent from 1997 to 2000.  The rise, 
then the decline in poultry exports 
partially explains the uneven price 
advances during the last eight years. 
 
The workings of the beef production 
cycle helped retail beef prices to lurch 
upward a total of 30 percent from 1986 
to 1990, slow to a 6 percent increase 
from 1990 to 1993 and to less than a 2 
percent gain from 1993 to 1999.  
Likewise, cyclical hog production 
helped retail pork prices rise 13 percent 
in one year from 1989 to 1990, then 
climb only a total of 4 percent during the 
following five years before jumping 16 
percent from 1995 to 1997.  They then 
fell 6 percent during the next two years. 
 
The modest increase in total meat 
production in 2001 will help support 
meat prices in 2001.  However, an 
expected slower rise in employment and 
consumer incomes may be a tempering 
factor.  The anticipated decline in beef 
output will likely keep beef prices 
advancing. However, pork and poultry 
prices may not rise as fast as in the past 
year.
  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Annual Net Foreign Trade of Livestock Products as a Percent of 
Production
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Figure 13: Average Annual Farm-Level Prices, Hogs and Poultry
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Figure 14: Annual Average Farm-Level Cattle Prices
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Corn and Soybean Outlook 
Randy Fortenbery 
(608) 262-4908 
 
Introduction 
 
For the fifth consecutive year, U.S. 
national average corn and soybean yields 
were at or above trend line levels.  This 
is the first five-year string of back-to-
back good-to-excellent crops in well 
over 30 years.  While this is an amazing 
accomplishment from a production 
perspective, this trend has had a negative 
impact on average price levels. 
 
Wisconsin, like the nation in general, 
also turned out excellent crops the last 
several years.  However, Wisconsin’s 
production as a percentage of national 
production has been less stable.  For 
example, in 1999 Wisconsin growers 
produced a much larger percentage of 
the national corn crop than they did in 
2000.  This brought more volatility in 
local prices relative to the mid-1990’s, 
and has increased basis volatility from 
year to year (basis is the difference 
between the local cash price and the 
futures price for the same commodity). 
 
Corn 
 
As of December 2000, the U.S. corn 
crop for the 2000/01 marketing year 
(September 1, 2000 through August 31, 
2001) was estimated at 10.05 billion 
bushels.  This is essentially equal to the 
record crop of 1994, but unlike 1994, the 
2000 crop followed an excellent 
production year.   
Table 4: US Corn  Balance Sheet (Sep/Aug)
USDA
USDA USDA USDA USDA USDA DEC EST.
Marketing Year 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01
Million Bushels
Beg Stocks 1,558 426 883 1,308 1,787 1,715
Imports 16 13 9 19 15 10
Acres Planted 71.2 79.2 79.5 80.2 77.4 79.6
Acres Harvested 65.0 72.6 72.7 72.6 70.5 73.0
% Harvested 91.3% 91.7% 91.4% 90.5% 91.1% 91.7%
Yield 113.5 127.2 126.6 134.4 133.8 137.7
Production 7,374 9,233 9,207 9,759 9,437 10,054
Total Supply 8,948 9,672 10,099 11,085 11,239 11,779
Feed & residual 4,696 5,302 5,505 5,496 5,676 5,850
Food/Seed/Ind. 1,598 1,692 1,782 1,822 1,913 1,975
Exports 2,228 1,795 1,504 1,981 1,935 2,200
Total Demand 8,522 8,789 8,791 9,298 9,524 10,025
Ending Stocks 426 883 1,308 1,787 1,715 1,754
Stocks To Use 5.00% 10.04% 14.88% 19.22% 18.01% 17.50%
Avg. Farm Price $3.24 $2.71 $2.43 $1.94 $1.80 $1.85
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Wisconsin corn production totaled  
363 million bushels in 2000 (November 
estimate), a reduction of almost  
11 percent over 1999.  The smaller 
Wisconsin crop relative to the national 
crop has resulted in excellent basis 
appreciation following the 2000 harvest 
season, and good storage returns early in 
the year.  However, in many parts of 
northern Wisconsin, storage 
opportunities beyond the first of the year 
will be limited.  Basis appreciation has 
already resulted in basis levels not 
normally seen until later in the year, and 
any additional returns to storage will 
need to come from a futures market 
rally.   
 
The smaller Wisconsin crop in 2000 
resulted from a 3.5 percent reduction in 
corn acres, and an 11-bushel per acre 
reduction over the record yields of 1999.  
Corn yields across Wisconsin in 2000 
averaged 132 bushels per acre, down 
from 143 bushels per acre in 1999.  
Despite the large reduction relative to 
the previous year, however, the current 
yield ties with 1997 as the fourth highest 
Wisconsin corn yield on record. 
 
Harvested corn acres in Wisconsin have 
been falling steadily since 1996, but 
until this past season higher yields had 
more than compensated for declining 
acres.  Wisconsin harvested fewer corn 
acres in 2000 than in any year since 
1993.  Before that, you have to go back 
to the 1988 drought to find fewer 
harvested corn acres. 
 
Average price levels for corn, both 
nationally and in Wisconsin, have drifted 
lower the last three years.  As seen from 
Figure 16, the average cash price for 
corn was about $2.25 per bushel in the 
early and mid-1990’s.  It is now below 
$2 per bushel, reflecting the current run 
of good to excellent production, and an 
associated build up in end-of-marketing-
year stocks. 
 
End-of-year stocks (referred to as the 
carryout) represent the market’s cushion 
against a crop production problem in the 
next harvest, and have a direct influence 
on both the average price level through 
the current marketing year, as well as 
prices offered for delivery commitments 
following the next harvest.  In general, 
the larger the anticipated carryout, the 
lower the average price during the 
marketing year, and the lower the pre-
harvest price offerings for the next 
harvested crop.   
 
Without a serious planting or production 
problem next year, ending stocks in 
2001/02 will not be reduced appreciably 
from the current projection for 2000/01.  
Therefore, producers need to reconsider 
what constitutes an attractive price 
guarantee for 2001 produced corn as 
they progress through the production 
season.  The current price levels of both 
energy and chemical inputs (especially 
fertilizer) suggest that corn acres could 
be reduced next year.  However, as 
Wisconsin’s recent experience suggests, 
a slight reduction in acres does not 
necessarily translate into a significant 
reduction in corn production.  Further, 
any acreage reductions are most likely to 
come from the Western corn-producing 
areas (for example the Dakotas) where 
acres were most recently brought into 
production.  This means acres taken out 
of corn production because of high input 
costs (at least in the first year) will be 
those with the lowest yield potential 
already.  It is unlikely that the traditional 
corn soybean rotations in the true Corn 
Belt will be significantly altered with 
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just one year of high input prices.  If the 
current input-cost-to-corn-price ratio 
persists into another production season, a 
more dramatic shift from corn 
production could occur.  However, the 
possibility of that happening probably 
won’t have a significant impact on corn 
prices in coming months. 
 
Soybeans 
 
The year 2000 continued to see 
aggressive increases in soybean acres 
nationally and in Wisconsin.  Soybean 
acres in the nation have increased 
rapidly since 1992, and in recent years 
have been heavily influenced by the 
current government farm program.  The 
current loan program, and associated 
loan deficiency payments (LDP), 
strongly favors the production of 
soybeans rather than corn and spring and 
winter wheat.  As a result, some of the 
most dramatic increases in soybean 
acreage happened on land formerly 
planted to wheat.  In North Dakota 
alone, soybean acres were increased 
about 50 percent relative to 1999, and 
now total over 2 million acres.  When 
South Dakota is included, the combined 
increase in soybean acres is almost 1 
million.  This more than offset acreage 
declines in other states. 
 
The Dakota experience is also reflected 
in Upper Midwest acreage allocations.  
Wisconsin grew 150,000 more acres of 
soybeans in 2000 than in 1999.  In 
addition, Minnesota added 200,000 acres 
and Michigan added 250,000 acres.  U.S. 
Table 5: US Soybean Balance Sheet (Sep/Aug)
USDA
USDA USDA USDA USDA USDA DEC
Marketing Year 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01
Million Bushels
Beg Stocks 335 183 132 200 348 288
Imports 5 9 5 3 4 3
Acres Planted 62.6 64.2 70 72 73.7 74.5
Acres Harvested 61.6 63.3 69.1 70.4 72.4 73.0
% Harvested 98.4% 98.6% 98.7% 97.8% 98.2% 98.0%
Yield 35.3           37.6           38.9           38.9           36.6           38.0           
Production 2,177         2,380         2,689         2,741         2,654         2,777         
Total Supply 2,517         2,572         2,826         2,944         3,006         3,068         
Crush Sep/Aug 1,370 1,436 1,597 1,590 1,579 1,605
Exports 851 882 873 801 970 975
F/S/R 111 123 156 205 170 167
Total Demand 2,332 2,441 2,626 2,595 2,719 2,747
Ending Stocks 185 131 200 348 288 320
Stocks To Use 7.93% 5.37% 7.60% 13.41% 10.59% 11.65%
Avg. Farm Price $6.77 $7.35 $6.47 $4.93 $4.65 $4.70
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soybean production is rapidly expanding 
north and west from traditional 
production areas. 
 
Like corn, soybean yields have remained 
healthy for each of the last five years.  
The combination of stable yields and 
aggressive acreage growth has resulted 
in several recent record soybean crops, 
including the 2000 crop.   
 
From Figure 17, note that soybean 
production, both nationally and in 
Wisconsin, remained stable through the 
1980’s.  Beginning in the early 1990’s, 
however, large acreage increases 
brought increased year-over-year 
production.  Growth in Wisconsin was 
particularly strong.  Wisconsin soybean 
production in 2000 was five times what 
it was 12 years ago, reflecting growth in 
acreage and improved yields.  In 1980 
the average Wisconsin soybean yield 
was 33 bushels per acre.  By 1990, it had 
increased to 41 bushels per acre, and in 
1999 averaged 46 bushels per acre.  The 
record average yield for Wisconsin came 
in 1998 at 47 bushels per acre.  The 
average yield in 2000 was 40 bushels per 
acre, a bit of a disappointment relative to 
the previous two years, but still well 
above the averages expected just a few 
years ago.  
 
As with corn, average soybean price 
levels in both the U.S. and Wisconsin 
have moved lower, reflecting the 
increase in soybean production.  Prices 
the last three years have been 
consistently below levels that seemed 
unachievable just 4 or 5 years ago.  
However, because of the relatively lower 
per-unit production costs compared to 
corn and wheat, and a more attractive 
price guarantee through the government 
loan program, soybean acres will 
continue to increase, putting even more 
downward pressure on market prices.  A 
look at average weekly prices for the 
nearby soybean futures contract (the 
futures contract closest to maturity) 
shows just how much average prices 
have changed (Figure 18).  Prior to 
1997, futures prices for soybeans 
averaged about $6.25 to $6.35 per 
bushel.  Prices below $5 were almost 
unheard of, and never lasted long if they 
did occur. 
 
While average corn prices have fallen, 
soybean prices have fallen much more.  
The average cash price for soybeans now 
is 75 cents or so lower than it was just 4 
or 5 years ago.  The most attractive 
pricing strategy for producers in this 
environment has been to forward-price 
next year’s production when futures 
prices reach the upper $5 range (a price 
associated with the absolute bottom of 
the potential price range in earlier years), 
and then hope to add a large LDP 
payment to that at harvest, with cash 
prices in the low $4 range.  Futures 
prices over $6 anytime during the 
marketing year have been rare, and until 
soybean carryout levels drop 
significantly, will continue to be elusive.  
Given the current farm program 
incentives, a significant drop in carryout 
likely will occur only with a substantial 
production disaster in the United States 
or Brazil. 
 
The current price levels of energy and 
chemical inputs increase the economic 
incentives to plant soybeans over corn 
and wheat.  As a result, if current prices 
persist into the planting season, we could 
easily see a 1-million-acre increase in 
U.S. soybean acres for 2001, and a 
corresponding increase in Wisconsin.  
Most of the national acreage increase 
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will likely occur in the most western and 
northern producing states.  However, if 
high energy prices persist beyond the 
2001 production season, soybean 
acreage could grow in the central Corn 
Belt as well. 
 
The current market environment 
suggests that soybean prices will 
continue to average in the low to sub-$5 
range in the coming year.  Producers 
who want to maximize pricing 
opportunities will need to be prepared to 
accept pre-harvest prices at levels 
unheard of just a few years ago.  
Without a significant production 
disruption in 2001, futures prices for 
soybean delivery in 2001 will be hard-
pressed to reach the $6 per bushel range, 
and will certainly not be sustainable at 
that level.  Given a normal planting and 
production season, the pricing strategy 
for soybean producers will be to 
maximize LDP payments to enhance 
historically low market prices.
 
Figure 15: Corn Production
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Figure 16: Average Annual Cash Corn Price
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Figure 17: Soybean Production
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Outlook for Farm Production 
Inputs 
Bruce Jones 
(608) 265-8508 
 
Farm Credit 
 
Credit conditions in agriculture are 
likely to change substantially in the 
coming year if farm income continues to 
be depressed.  Cash-strapped farmers 
will probably be forced to turn to lenders 
to meet their short-run cash needs.  
Fortunately most farmers should be able 
to get needed credit because they have 
the equity needed to satisfy their lenders’ 
credit standards. 
 
Farmers’ demand for credit has been on 
the rise for the last few years, mostly to 
finance land purchases and 
improvements in dairy facilities.  Now 
that farm incomes are depressed, farmers 
will cut back on the use of credit for 
capital purchases and instead start 
requesting the operating credit they need 
to offset operating losses and cash-flow 
deficits.  The increased demand for 
operating credit should be greater than 
the cutbacks in demand for capital 
credit. Hence total borrowing by farmers 
in the coming year should be up 
markedly from what it has been the last 
few years. 
 
Demand for farm real estate loans could 
be up substantially in the next year but 
not for the purpose of buying land or 
financing improvements.  Instead, 
demand for real estate mortgages will 
Figure 18: Weekly Average Soybean Prices - Nearby Futures
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come from farmers who want to 
restructure existing debts.  These farmers 
will be seeking to negotiate more 
affordable principal and interest 
payments on their existing loans.  
Refinancing debts should ease farmers’ 
short-run cash flow problems but will 
not eliminate the problems that are 
rooted in low prices and farm incomes. 
 
Farmers with little or no real estate debt 
might be wise to consider mortgaging 
their farms and obtaining real estate 
credit instead of using operating loans to 
offset cash flow deficits.  Interest rates 
on real estate mortgages tend to be lower 
than those charged on operating loans, as 
evidenced by the interest rates presented 
in Table 6. 
 
Farm loan interest rate data reported in 
the Agricultural Newsletter (issued by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) 
show that interest rates on farm real 
estate loans have typically been .60 to 
1.21 percentage points lower than 
interest rates on farm operating loans.  
These data also show how the gap 
between the interest rates for operating 
loans and real estate loans has widened 
during the 1995-2000 period.  This latter 
point is important because it suggests 
that interest rates on real estate 
mortgages may be more stable than 
operating loan interest rates.  Given that 
the interest rates on real estate mortgages 
tend to be lower and less volatile than 
the interest rates on operating loans, 
there are some incentives for farmers to 
use real estate credit in favor of 
operating loans. 
 
There is little reason to believe that 
agricultural lenders will be unable to 
satisfy the increased credit demands of 
farmers.  Commercial bankers, the Farm 
Credit System and other commercial 
lenders are all well positioned to tap into 
financial markets and get needed capital 
for credit-worthy farmers. 
 
Just because agricultural lenders have 
ready access to capital does not mean 
they will respond favorably to every 
credit request.  These financial 
institutions are intermediaries; they are 
responsible for insuring that the capital 
they obtain in financial markets and loan 
to farmers ultimately is returned to the 
investors who provided this capita.  It is 
critical that agricultural lenders make 
good on their obligations to investors.  If 
Table 6: Interest Rates on Farm Loans (For April - June Period) Reported by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Year Operating Loans ( % ) Real Estate Loans ( % ) 
1995 10.24 9.64 
1996 9.69 8.81 
1997 8.83 
1998 
9.72 
9.54 8.52 
1999 9.11 8.18 
2000 10.43 9.21 
 30
they do not, they could jeopardize their 
access to financial capital in the future.  
If this occurs, farmers would no longer 
have access to credit. 
 
Therefore, financial lenders are reluctant 
to extend credit to farmers who would be 
borrowing heavily against land, cows, 
machinery and other farm assets.  The 
probabilities of a default are judged to be 
great. 
 
It is understood that a lack of collateral 
can prevent some farmers from receiving 
credit from commercial banks, the Farm 
Credit System, and other commercial 
lenders.  To help alleviate this collateral 
problem, both the federal and state 
governments have created some farm 
loan guarantee programs.  Under these 
programs, the government provides loan 
guarantees to lenders who are willing to 
extend credit to farmers who are unable 
to meet the lenders’ collateral standards.  
The federal farm loan guarantee program 
is administered by the Farm Service 
Agency and Wisconsin’s program is run 
by the Wisconsin Housing and 
Economic Development Authority. 
 
Federal and state farm loan guarantee 
programs should enable most farmers to 
get the credit they need but there will 
still be some farmers who do not qua lify 
for credit.  These unfortunate individuals 
will be forced to go through foreclosure 
proceedings or bankruptcy.  
Foreclosures and bankruptcies should 
not be all that common in the near term, 
but, if farm income remained depressed 
for an extended period of time, these 
events are likely to become more 
widespread in the state. 
 
At this time it does not appear that 
farmers are going to have their financial 
problems compounded by rising interest 
rates.  In fact there is a good chance that 
interest rates could fall modestly in the 
coming year if, as expected, the Federal 
Reserve Bank decides to stimulate the 
economy by cutting interest rates.  
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan has expressed his concern 
about the possibility of recession and 
appears to be willing to cut interest rates 
in order to counteract the forces that are 
slowing down the economy.  If the 
Federal Reserve Board follows through 
with this policy, interest rates could be 
heading down.  Farmers who are going 
to have to increase their borrowing in 
2001 would welcome rate cuts. 
 
Farmland Values 
 
Things are a little gloomy in the farm 
economy given that low commodity 
prices have depressed farm incomes.  
The situation is not nearly as bleak as it 
was in the 1980’s, when farmers’ 
financial problems were compounded by 
a collapse of the farmland market.  Back 
then, farmland values fell by nearly 50 
percent in less than four years.  This 
collapse of the farm real estate market 
was the primary cause of the farm crisis 
of the 1980s.  
 
The good news is that farmland values 
are holding steady or rising despite the 
drop in farm incomes.  This stability in 
farmland values is a little surprising 
given that in the last decade farm 
incomes have been on a downtrend.  
Economic theory suggests that declining 
farm incomes should result in decreasing 
farmland values. Since this has not 
occurred, we have to conclude that some 
factor other than farm income is 
influencing the farm real estate market.  
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This other factor seems to be the non-
farm real estate market. 
 
As shown in Figure 19, in the past few 
years Wisconsin’s farm real estate 
values have been rising at roughly the 
same rate as residential and commercial 
property values.  This suggests that the 
residential and commercial property 
markets are driving the Wisconsin 
farmland market.  This linkage between 
the farm and non-farm real estate 
markets suggests that, at least in the near 
term, farmland values could hold steady. 
 
Another factor that could be giving some 
support to farmland values is the new 
use-value assessment program that is 
being used in Wisconsin to levy property 
taxes on farmland.  Prior to adopting 
use-value assessment, Wisconsin 
farmers had to pay property taxes based 
on the market value of farmland.  Under 
the market approach to taxing farmland 
farmers’ property taxes were nearly 
double the taxes currently paid under the 
use-value system. 
 
Now that farmland property taxes are 
substantially below historic levels, the 
returns from owning farmland are 
higher.  As such, the value of land is up 
because people can expect to earn higher 
net returns on land.  Thus, the new use-
value assessment system for taxing 
farmland should have a positive effect 
on real estate values. 
 
Cash Rents for Crop Land 
 
From 1994 to 2000, per acre rents for 
cropland in Wisconsin rose roughly 
 30 percent, from almost $49 to $65.  
This run-up in cash rents was fueled by 
relatively strong corn prices in 1997 and 
1998 and it has continued even though 
market prices for corn have dropped 
dramatically the last couple of years. 
Figure 19: Real Estate Value Indexes
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On the surface, it would seem that cash 
rents should be declining in light of 
lower potential earnings from land.  
While market prices for corn have 
dropped, government payments to 
farmers, in the form of loan deficiency 
payments, transition payments, and 
emergency payments, have helped offset 
decreases in corn prices and propped up 
returns from land.  In the absence of 
government payments, returns to land 
would have fallen and most likely 
triggered a reduction in land rents. 
 
The recent increases in farmland rental 
rates are in part a function of increased 
demands for land. Farmers who are 
hard-pressed to make good on their loan 
payments and cover their living costs are 
aggressively bidding for land, hoping 
these additional acres will provide the 
income and cash they need to survive.  
This competition among farmers has put 
upward pressures on land rent in recent 
years. Over time this competition for 
land should decline as some farmers go 
out of business. When this happens, land 
rents will decline if commodity prices 
stay at current levels. Alternatively, rents 
could rise further if commodity prices 
recover in the near term.  In any case, it 
is doubtful farmers can continue to 
afford to pay the rents they have been 
paying. 
 
Production Inputs 
 
Increases of 2 to 5 percent in farm input 
prices are predicted for the next year by 
D.H. Doster of Purdue University. This 
increase comes on the heels of a  
5 percent hike in the price of farm inputs 
last year. 
 
Doster offers a mixed forecast for 
fertilizer prices. He expects anhydrous 
nitrogen to be up 30 to 40 percent, 
reflecting higher natural gas prices. Urea 
nitrogen is expected to be readily 
available and prices for this fertilizer are 
likely to be unchanged from last year. 
Potash prices are expected to remain 
relatively low and increase no more than 
5 percent in 2001. 
 
Doster forecasts no significant increases 
in farm chemical prices.  Normally, 
higher petroleum prices would be 
expected to boost chemical prices.  
However competitive pressures and 
mergers within the agricultural chemical 
industries are keeping chemical 
companies from passing on their 
increased costs to farmers. 
 
Seed prices are not expected to change 
much but the price of newer seed 
varieties, which promise higher yields, 
could be priced at levels 10 percent 
higher than more conventional seeds. 
 
Fuel prices are the big unknown in the 
coming year. Last year fuel prices were 
up sharply because OPEC nations 
tightened crude oil supplies. If OPEC 
continues to restrict crude oil supplies, 
fuel prices in the coming year are likely 
to be as high as they were in 2000.  
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This article begins by tracing the 
emergence of the "Goldilocks" economy 
in the United States during the 1990s.  
Then it explains why growth of the U.S. 
economy can be expected to continue 
slowing in 2001, discusses the economic 
environment likely to exist when 
development of the 2002 Farm Bill 
begins, and describes agricultural policy 
provisions that might emerge in 2002 
farm legislation.  
 
It is useful to consider the outlook for 
the U.S. economy and that of U.S. 
agricultural policy together.  
Developments that affect the national 
economy will influence the agricultural 
policy measures that are needed (and 
feasible to include) in the next major 
Farm Bill.  In particular, growth of the 
national economy and consumer income 
will influence the demand for 
agricultural products and needed levels 
of agricultural price supports.  
Moreover, the size of federal budget 
surpluses will affect the economic 
environment that will exist when the 
2002 Farm Bill is crafted and influence 
the extent to which the Congress and 
Administration will be positioned to 
support farm commodity prices. 
 
Emergence of the "Goldilocks" 
Economy in the 1990s 
 
For much of the 1990s, the United States 
had what is often called a Goldilocks 
economy.  Like the porridge that 
Goldilocks found in the story of the 
three bears, the economy was not too 
hot, not too cold, just right.  The 
Goldilocks economy with its strong 
growth, tame inflation, and relatively 
high employment was the envy of the 
world during much of the past decade 
(See Table 7).  The U.S. economy 
expanded for a record 118 months 
during the 1990s and 2000, often at rates 
that in earlier years would have been 
considered unsustainable.  By serving as 
a strong market for exports, the robust 
U.S. economy helped to pull Mexico out 
of recession in the mid-1990s and Asian 
economies out of recession in the late 
1990s.  And beginning in 1998, the U.S. 
economy generated budget surpluses for 
the first time since 1969.   
 
Record increases in stock prices 
accompanied the strong performance of 
the economy until 2000.  Stock prices 
increased by over 20 percent per year 
during the last half of the 1990s before 
becoming volatile, moving sideways and 
frequently downward during 2000.  The 
increase in the value of stock portfolios 
produced a wealth effect that spurred 
consumer spending and helped to sustain 
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high levels of economic growth in the 
United States.  The wealth effect is not 
trivial.  A rule of thumb is that the 
wealth effect produces $3 to $4 in 
consumer spending for each $100 
increase in stock market wealth. 
 
Many things besides the stock market 
wealth effect contributed to the 
economy’s strength, including 
productivity gains associated with 
adoption of computer technology, 
emergence of "new economy" 
companies that emphasized information 
technology, a host of other forces that 
produced strong corporate earnings, low 
oil prices for at least part of the period, 
appropriate Federal Reserve interest rate 
policies, and the elimination of budget 
deficits. The last development reduced 
the federal government’s demand for 
credit and helped to produce lower 
interest rates.  
 
Obviously not all sectors of the U.S. 
economy prospered during the 1990s.  
The U.S. farm economy experienced 
problems during the late 1990s, 
substantially because of global 
overproduction of major crops and 
livestock products and weak foreign 
demand for U.S. agricultural exports.
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Growth, Inflation and Unemployment Rates for the U.S. Economy 
 
 
Year and 
Quarter 
 
Real GDP 
Growth 
 
Consumer Price 
Index 
 
Unemployment  
Rate 
 --Percent-- 
1992 3.0 2.9 7.5 
1993 2.7 2.7 6.9 
1994 4.0 2.7 6.1 
1995 2.7 2.5 5.6 
1996 3.6 3.3 5.4 
1997 4.4 1.7 4.9 
1998 4.4 1.6 4.5 
1999 4.2 2.7 4.2 
2000:    
Q1 4.8 4.3 4.1 
Q2 5.6 3.7 4.0 
Q3 2.2 3.1 4.0 
Q4 (Forecast) NA 2.7 4.0 
    
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, “Economic Indicators,” November 2000 and 
Standard and Poor’s, “U.S. Forecast Summary,” October and November 2000. 
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Continued Slowing of the Economy in 
2001 
 
The demise of the Goldilocks economy 
has been prematurely forecasted before 
and forecasters may be wrong yet again. 
However, signs point to continued 
slowing of the economy in 2001.  
Evidence of the slowdown is provided 
by the real GDP growth figures for 2000, 
which declined from 5.6 percent in 
Quarter 2 to 2.2 percent in Quarter 3. 
Many factors will contribute to slower 
economic growth in 2001.  These 
include the impacts of the six increases 
in the federal funds rate that the Federal 
Reserve put in place beginning in mid-
1999, higher oil and natural gas prices, 
weaker corporate earnings, associated 
downward movements in stock prices, 
lower consumer confidence, weaker 
retail sales, tightening of credit, 
overcapacity problems in the auto 
industry, and the protracted period of 
uncertainty over the outcome of the 
Presidential election.   
 
A potentially positive outgrowth of these 
developments is a decline in the value of 
the U.S. dollar.  The U.S. dollar has been 
strong relative to the Euro, Japanese yen, 
and many other currencies in recent 
years in part because of the 
attractiveness of investment 
opportunities in the United States.  As 
growth of the economy slows, the U.S. 
dollar is likely to weaken relative to the 
Euro in particular.  This development 
should enhance U.S. trade 
competitiveness.  These developments 
will be positive if the decline in the 
value of the dollar is gradual.    
 
If all goes well, the economy will make 
the “soft landing” that Federal Reserve 
Chairman, Alan Greenspan, has tried to 
orchestrate with six interest rate hikes.  
Fed policies and other developments 
could produce the soft landing and cause 
the economy to grow at a new 
sustainable rate of about 3.5 percent per 
year.  This new growth rate might be 
accompanied by relatively tame,  
2 percent to 3 percent, inflation and low 
unemployment.  But less sanguine 
outcomes are possible.  
 
Many analysts predict a slower real GDP 
growth rate of 3 percent (plus or minus a 
half percentage point for 2001).  Few 
predict an immediate recession.  
However, there is a broad consensus that 
for now we have seen the last of the  
20 percent-plus annual increases in stock 
prices witnessed in the last half of the 
1990s.  Volatile, more normal annual 
returns from stocks averaging 8 percent 
to 10 percent annually appear likely to 
re-emerge during the next few years.  
This means that the consumption-
enhancing wealth effect of stock market 
gains will be lower during the next 
several years. 
 
A soft landing (with a real growth rate of 
about 3 percent) is likely to characterize 
the behavior of the economy during the 
next year or two. What would cause a 
recession? (A recession is defined as at 
least two consecutive quarters of 
declining real growth.)  Oil price hikes 
might. Given the uncertain political 
climate in important foreign supply 
areas, higher oil prices are possible. 
However, it would take oil prices 
sharply higher than the $30 to $35 per 
barrel prices that preva iled during much 
of late 2000 to cause a recession.  This is 
partly because oil now represents a 
smaller percentage of economic activity 
(1 percent to 2 percent of GDP) than in 
the late 1970s (when oil was 6 percent to 
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7 percent of GDP).  In the late 1970s, a 
run-up in oil prices contributed to a 
recession.  A Standards & Poor’s model 
indicates that oil prices of $40 per barrel 
would reduce GDP by 1.3 percentage 
points.  While this estimate might be 
questioned, it is clear that oil price 
increases will not have the large impact 
recorded in earlier years.  
 
Policy mistakes could contribute to a 
recession.  Many analysts expect that the 
Federal Reserve will hold the federal 
funds interest rate unchanged at 6.5 
percent until early to mid-2001.  The 
Fed, fully aware that the economy is 
cooling, has moved from its inflation 
fighting bias, which might have 
necessitated additional interest rate 
hikes, to a neutral stance.  Its next move 
will be to decide when to reduce interest 
rates.  If the Fed underestimates the 
speed at which the economy is slowing, 
it may fail to give the economy a needed 
boost via a timely interest rate cut. Fed 
Chairman, Alan Greenspan, had a 
laudable record in preserving the 
Goldilocks economy during the 1990s.  
But a policy error of this type did 
materialize during the U.S. economy’s 
last recession in 1991.   
 
A wild card is the stock market. 
Economist Dean Baker constructed the 
following scary but plausible story about 
the impact of an additional pronounced 
stock market correction in the 
September-October, 2000 issue of 
Challenge magazine:  
 
"…a 50 percent decline in the 
stock market could reduce 
annual consumption 
expenditures by approximately 
$350 billion or approximately 
3.8 percent of GDP.  If this 
reduction occurred in a short 
period of time, it would 
virtually guarantee a steep 
recession.  Since many firms 
are also using new stock issues 
to finance investment….a stock 
crash would likely lead to a 
substantial reduction in 
investment, further reducing 
demand.  A market crash also 
will lead to a large reduction in 
government revenue."  
 
Baker’s scenario might be dismissed as 
an extreme case.  However, 
underpinning the scenario is the fact that 
the average price/earnings ratio for U.S. 
stocks exceeded 30 to 1 in the late 1990s 
and early 2000. This is more than twice 
the historic average of less than 15 to 1, 
suggesting that a 50 percent decline in 
stock prices is possible.  While it is 
unclear what would trigger such a large, 
across-the-board stock market 
correction, the effects of any such 
correction would be damaging.  
 
Impacts of the slowing U.S. economy 
will not be uniform across the nation.   
Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois, with their high concentration of 
smokestack manufacturing industries, 
are now strongly feeling the brunt of the 
Fed's higher interest rates and 
overcapacity in the auto industry.  These 
states are likely to grow more slowly 
than the nation as a whole in 2001, 
recording approximately 2.0 percent real 
growth rates while the rest of the nation 
grows at about a 3 percent real rate.   
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The Economic Backdrop for 
Developing the 2002 Farm Bill 
 
The economic environment that will 
exist when deliberations on the 2002 
Farm Bill begin will reflect 
macroeconomic (general economy) 
developments as well as those unique to 
the farm economy.  
 
 Macroeconomic Conditions  
 
To review, the macroeconomic 
conditions likely to provide the backdrop 
for development of the next major U.S. 
Farm Bill include: 
 
· Slower growth, probably a real 
GDP growth rate of 3 percent 
plus or minus half a percentage 
point.   
 
· Lower interest rates than existed 
in late 2000. 
 
· Continued relatively low 
inflation (consumer price index 
increases of 2.5 to 3.5 percent).  
  
· Modestly lower oil prices than 
existed in late 2000. 
 
· A weaker dollar in foreign 
exchange markets. 
 
· Federal budget surpluses for 
2001 and 2002 smaller than the 
one forecasted in the schedule 
below for 2001. This is probable 
because of lower tax revenues 
produced by slower economic 
growth, a possible tax cut in 
2001 or 2002, and adoption of 
spending measures advocated 
during the 2000 Presidential 
campaign.  
Year  Federal Budget Surpluses* 
 
1998  $  69.2 Billion  
1999    124.4 
2000    237.0 
2001    228.0 
 
*Source: Council of Economic Advisers, 
"Economic Indicators", November 2000. 
 
 
Among other things, these conditions 
suggest that domestic consumer demand 
for agricultural products will be 
reasonably strong when deliberations on 
the 2002 Farm Bill begin. Less certain is 
the strength of export demand for U.S. 
farm products.  That demand component 
is considered below.   
 
Conditions in the Farm Economy     
 
The 1996 Farm Bill (officially called the 
Federal Agricultural Improvement and 
Reform Act and unofficially the 
"Freedom to Farm" Act) was passed 
when U.S. agricultural exports were 
booming, market prices for many 
agricultural products were relatively 
high, and government support for the 
sector was low.  The Freedom to Farm 
Act represented a departure from farm 
programs that had existed since the 
1930s.  Thus, excluded from the 1996 
Farm Bill were acreage reduction 
programs (supply control measures) and 
target price and deficiency payments for 
producers of major crops. Gone too were 
the relatively high non-recourse crop 
loan rates that had existed in some 
previous Farm Bills. The USDA’s dairy 
price support program was scheduled for 
elimination at the end of 1999. 
 38
In 1998, less than two years after the 
1996 Farm Bill was passed, market 
prices for many U.S. farm products 
began slumping.  The lower market 
prices stemmed from declining farm 
exports and overproduction.  The impact 
of the drop in farm prices is reflected in 
U.S. farm income statistics for 1996 to 
2000 (Table 8).   
 
Crop receipts recorded the largest 
reduction, falling $17 billion  
(15 percent) during 1997 to 2000.  
Aggregate cash receipts from all 
livestock remained fairly constant during 
1997 to 2000 and were actually 
forecasted to record a small (4 percent) 
increase from 1997 to 2000.  Net cash 
farm income also exhibited more 
stability than crops receipts, falling 
about $3.1 billion (5 percent) from 1997 
to 2000.  An approximate tripling of 
direct government payments to farmers 
from 1997 to 2000 cushioned the fall in 
net cash farm income.   
 
While the increase in direct government 
payments to farmers during 1998 to 
2000 was large, the payments remained 
relatively small as a percentage of total 
federal budget outlays.  For example, 
direct government payments in 1999 and 
2000 represented 1.2 percent and 1.3 
percent, respectively, of total federal 
budget outlays for these years. As 
percentages of total federal budget 
outlays, the expenditures for direct 
government payments to U.S. farmers 
for 1999 and 2000 were only about 
three-quarters as large as those made 
during the depths of the farm recession 
in the 1980s.   
 
The depressed cash receipts for crops 
during the late 1990s are traceable partly 
to increased domestic and world 
production and shrinking export 
demand.  U.S. corn production was a 
modest 2.2 percent higher in 1999/2000 
than in 1996/97.  The increase for the 
comparable period for soybeans was a 
substantially larger 22 percent. Hit by a 
10 percent expansion in domestic 
Table 8: U.S. Farm Income Statistics and Agricultural Exports 
 
 
Receipts 
Category 
 
 
1996 
 
 
1997 
 
 
1998 
 
 
1999 
 
 
2000 
      
 
Cash Receipts: 
$ Billion 
     Crops 106.3 111.1 102.5 93.1 94.1 
     Livestock 92.8 96.5 94.1 95.5 100.3 
Direct Gov’t. Payments 7.3 7.5 12.2 20.6 23.3 
Net Cash Income 57.6 58.5 55.4 54.6 55.4 
Agricultural Exports 59.8 57.3 53.6 49.1 50.5 
 
Source: USDA. “Agricultural Outlook,” October and November 2000.  Figures for 1999 
are preliminary and figures for 2000 are forecasts. 
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production and reduced slaughter 
capacity, U.S. hog producers saw farm 
level hog prices (for hogs not sold under 
contracts) drop to Great Depression 
levels late in 1998.  Beef production 
scored smaller increases but did rise by  
5 percent to 6 percent from 1997 to 
2000.  Farm milk prices held up until 
late 1999 but have been depressed since 
that time, reflecting mostly higher milk 
production in California, Idaho, Arizona, 
and other Western states.     
 
The declining export sales of U.S. crops 
and livestock products were caused in 
part by depressed economic conditions 
in Asia and Russia and substantial 
increases in world production.  The 
following schedule shows the percentage 
increases in annual average world 
production of major agricultural 
products from the period approximately 
four years before the 1996 Farm Bill to 
the period four years after passage of the 
1996 Farm Bill. 
 
 
Product       Production Increase: 
          1992/93-1995/96 to  
             1996/97-1999/00* 
 
Coarse Grains     6.4% 
Wheat      8.4 
Rice      8.1 
Oilseeds              16.8 
Oils              17.6 
Red Meat                6.8 
Poultry             25.6 
Milk      1.0 
 
Source: USDA, "Agricultural Outlook", 
November 2000.  
 
 
With several exceptions, the increases 
appearing in the above schedule appear 
moderate.  However, in the face of weak 
foreign demand in important export 
markets, U.S. and world prices for 
certain agricultural commodities were 
pushed sharply lower by these supply 
increases.  
 
As noted earlier in Table 8, total U.S. 
agricultural exports declined from $59.8 
billion in 1996 to $50.5 billion in 2000.  
This decline was mostly concentrated in 
grain and feeds and to a lesser extent in 
oilseeds and products.  U.S. grain and 
feed exports declined from $21.6 billion 
in 1996 to $13.6 billion in 2000  
(37 percent) while exports of oilseeds 
and products declined from $9.7 billion 
in 1996 to $8.7 billion in 2000  
(10 percent).  The dollar value of most 
other U.S. agricultural exports remained 
nearly constant or recorded small 
increases during this period.  While 
starting from a low base of $0.7 billion 
in 1996, dairy product exports actually 
increased by 43 percent during this 
period.  
 
Whither U.S. Agricultural Exports? The 
USDA forecasts that U.S. agricultural 
exports will increase by about $1.0 
billion (2 percent) to $51.5 billion in 
2001.  The Agency expected corn 
exports to account for about two-thirds 
of the increase in bulk agricultural 
exports from 2000 to 2001.  This 
increase in exports was expected to stem 
from lower competition from China and 
Eastern Europe and modestly stronger 
global demand.  However, corn exports 
from China now appear likely to be 
larger than expected, which translates to 
smaller increases in U.S. corn exports 
than forecast by the USDA.  Exports of 
most other U.S. agricultural products are 
forecasted to show only minor changes 
from 2000 to 2001.  
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Agricultural exports are difficult to 
forecast.  But barring massive crop 
failures in foreign markets, it is difficult 
to construct realistic scenarios showing 
U.S. agricultural exports returning soon 
to near the $60 billion per year level 
existing when the 1996 Farm Bill was 
passed.  Moreover, even substantial 
production shortfalls in the United States 
or elsewhere will not instantly show up 
in higher U.S. farm product prices 
because it will take time to work off the 
large existing stocks.  
 
How Payments under the 1996 Farm Bill 
were Supplemented.  The Congress and 
Administration supplemented the 
payments to be made to U.S. farmers 
under the 1996 Farm Bill to prevent net 
cash farm income from falling as sharply 
as crop revenues or agricultural exports.  
To assess what provisions might be 
considered for the 2002 Farm Bill, it is 
useful to review the main types of 
regular and supplemental government 
financial support that were made to U.S. 
farmers in 2000. 
 
The USDA estimates that the $23.3 
billion of direct government payments to 
U.S. farmers in 2000 will be obtained 
from the programs listed below. 
Program Percent of Payments* 
 
Emergency Assistance 38% 
Loan Deficiency Payments 32 
Product Flexibility  
Contracts   21 
Conservation Reserve  
and Other      9 
Total             100% 
 
*Source:  USDA, "U.S. Farm Programs 
Benefits: Links to Planting Decisions 
and Agricultural Markets", Agricultural 
Outlook, October 2000. 
 
 
The largest payment component was 
represented by emergency assistance. 
Three supplemental legislative packages 
passed by Congress and the 
Administration since October 1998 
provided emergency assistance mostly in 
response to low farm commodity prices.  
Loan deficiency payments, the second 
largest payment category, were 
authorized under provisions provided by 
the 1996 Farm Bill but were expected to 
find little use.  Loan deficiency 
payments provided about $6.4 billion in 
payments to crop producers for fiscal 
2000. 
 
When the 1996 Farm Bill was passed 
production flexibility contract payments 
(sometimes called transition payments) 
were thought to represent the main 
residual payment to farmers who were 
expected to “graduate” to a free market.  
But as noted earlier, weakness in 
agricultural export markets and global 
overproduction short-circuited this 
change.  The Conservation Reserve 
Program, which pays farmers for idling 
up to 36 million acres of potentially 
erosion-prone farmland, also was part of 
the 1996 Farm Bill. 
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Dairy farmers have received Market 
Loss Assistance Payments and 
extensions of the dairy price support 
program in the past two years.  The most 
recent and largest of the Market Loss 
Assistance Payments was authorized 
under an Agricultural Appropriations bill 
signed into Law by President Clinton in 
October 2000.  Under the program, the 
USDA expects to make $650 million in 
payments to dairy producers to partially 
offset effects of low milk prices.  The 
capped payments will be made at the 
rate of $0.6468 per hundredweight for a 
maximum of  $25,225 per producer.  
 
Under the 1996 Farm Bill the dairy price 
support program was scheduled to end 
on December 31, 1999.  In a second one-
year extension, the 2001 Agriculture 
Appropriations Bill extended the dairy 
price support program through 
December 31, 2001 at its current level of 
$9.80 per hundredweight for 3.5 percent 
butterfat milk.   
 
The federal government supports the 
agricultural sector by means in addition 
to direct payments to farmers. Thus, in 
2000 the federal government provided 
support to the agricultural sector through 
crop insurance premium subsidies, 
marketing loan gains, and price supports 
for sugar, peanuts, tobacco, and as noted 
above, dairy. 
 
In summary, the 1996 Farm Bill failed to 
provide politically acceptable levels of 
income for U.S. farmers.  The export 
market, in particular, failed to deliver 
results hoped for by architects of the 
1996 farm legislation.  Other events 
conspired to drive prices to exceedingly 
low levels for products as diverse as 
hogs, cranberries, and apples, creating 
demands for assistance from producers 
of these commodities.  Prior to the last 
year or so, producers of these 
commodities had little received little 
support from government programs.   
 
Emergency assistance and other 
supplements to the 1996 Farm Bill 
prevented sharp reductions in farm 
income and farm asset values. Partly 
because of the assistance package and 
lender and borrower caution, U.S. farm 
debt levels did not increase much during 
the late 1990s and 2000.  The USDA 
estimates that farm debt-to-equity and 
farm debt-to-asset ratios will rise by less 
than 5 percent from 1996 to 2000.  U.S. 
farm real estate asset values increased by 
about 13 percent from 1996 to 2000, 
reflecting impacts of the farm assistance 
packages, demand for farmland for non-
farm uses, and a host of other 
developments.  In the U.S. Corn Belt, 
farmland prices tended to move 
irregularly sideways in the late 1990s.  
While assistance measures helped to 
keep farm incomes from falling 
precipitously, the measures also 
produced price signals that prevented 
cutbacks in the production of surplus 
farm products.  
 
Agricultural Policy Provisions that 
Might Emerge in the 2002 Farm Bill 
 
Forecasting the nature of the next major 
Farm Bill is fraught with obvious 
difficulties.  However, if the history of 
previous Farm Bill debates is useful as a 
guide, the new farm legislation probably 
will reflect the following considerations:  
  
· Farmers will not willingly return 
to acreage reduction programs 
and other farm program 
provisions that strip them of the 
ability to decide what and how 
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much to produce.  Farmers like 
the “Freedom to Farm” 
provisions that gave them 
discretion about how much of the 
different crops to plant each year.  
 
· Policymakers (and probably 
many farmers) will be reluctant 
to return to high non-recourse 
loan rates that reduce crop 
exports.  While agricultural 
exports are not the powerful 
engine supporting crop prices 
they once were, they are still 
sufficiently important that 
policymakers will be reluctant to 
do things that would price U.S. 
crops out of world markets.   
 
· While loan deficiency payments 
for crop producers required 
larger than anticipated budget 
outlays under the 1996 Farm Bill, 
those provisions provided 
support to crop producers 
without pricing farm 
commodities out of world 
markets.  Hence, policymakers 
may favor them.  
 
· While they will get an extensive 
hearing in the Congress, supply 
control measures for major crops 
and livestock products are likely 
to find limited use in the next 
Farm Bill.  The economic 
inefficiencies associated with 
supply controls are likely to 
make them difficult to sell to the 
diverse producer groups in most 
of agriculture.  
 
· Programs that produce negative 
spillovers onto producers of 
products other than the object of 
the legislation will be a tough 
sell.  Thus, beef producers will 
strongly resist dairy herd buyouts 
or related programs that increase 
competing market supplies of 
beef. 
 
· Farmers who received temporary 
government assistance in the late 
1990s and 2000 (e.g. hog 
producers, cranberry producers, 
apple producers, etc.) are likely 
to seek continued government 
support in some form.   
 
· Although it is difficult to tell just 
how binding this constraint will 
be, federal budget outlays for 
farm programs probably will be 
constrained to a greater extent 
than in the late 1990s and 2000.  
While federal budget surpluses 
likely will exist in 2002, tax cuts, 
Social Security reform, Medicare 
reform, and other claims on the 
federal budget will limit 
spending on farm commodity 
programs.  Among other things, 
budget constraints will encourage 
policymakers to cap total 
payments to individual 
producers. 
 
· Major reforms in federal milk 
orders that would place dairy 
farmers in the Upper Midwest in 
a more favorable competitive 
position will continue to be 
elusive.  Small adjustments to 
pricing provisions and other fine-
tuning of the orders will be 
feasible. 
 
· Policymakers will view 
favorably farm program 
expenditures that produce 
environmental benefits.  
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Where Do These Considerations Leave 
Policymakers?   
 
Obviously, a lot can happen to affect 
farm policies between now and late 2001 
and 2002 when development of the next 
major Farm Bill begins in earnest.  But a 
few things are likely to shape the 2002 
Farm Bill.  A return to acreage reduction 
programs, target prices, and deficiency 
payments would be both expensive in 
terms of budget outlays and 
objectionable to producers who like 
“freedom to farm.”  Supply control 
measures are getting attention from dairy 
groups but there appears to be little 
agreement about how supply control 
measures might be implemented in ways 
that would satisfy groups as diverse as 
large, expanding producers and smaller 
producers.    
 
The only “slam dunk” prediction that 
can be made is that expansion of the 
Conservation Reserve Program beyond 
36 million acres is likely.  This program, 
if properly administered, reduces soil 
erosion, provides a limited amount of 
broadly acceptable supply control, and 
pays farmers for providing services that 
enhance the environment.  These are 
strong pluses. 
 
Perhaps a “muddling through” strategy 
will emerge that, in many respects, will 
represent a continuation of the 
patchwork of programs similar to that 
used under the 1996 Farm Bill.  
Measures that might receive increased 
emphasis include expenditures to 
increase production of value-added farm 
crops, expand farm exports, foster rural 
development, foster exit from the farm 
sector, and increase antitrust scrutiny of 
agribusiness mergers. 
 
The “Holy Grail” sought in the next 
Farm Bill will be measures to allow 
market prices to facilitate supply 
adjustments while providing politically 
acceptable farm incomes.  But this will 
be a difficult task. In practice, effective 
decoupling of payments to farmers from 
production decisions has proven to be 
difficult.   
 
 A Summary Comment   
 
The U.S. economy is in transition, 
moving toward slower, probably 
sustainable, growth.  The directions that 
the U.S. farm economy and farm policy 
are taking are less clear.  The 1996 Farm 
Bill was an experiment that, for a 
number of reasons, failed to produce 
results hoped for by the legislation’s 
architects.  However, the legislation let a 
genie out of the bottle.  It gave farmers a 
taste of freedom to farm (and emergency 
assistance payments) and they liked it.  
Producers who hadn’t received much 
government support before the late 
1990s and 2000 got a taste of it and they 
will want to keep it coming. This 
suggests that farm legislation will not 
revert to legislation that existed before 
the 1996 Farm Bill and supplements to 
that legislation.  Neither are 
policymakers likely to have a stomach 
for bold experiments akin to the 1996 
Farm Bill.  This leaves “muddling 
through” as the likely option.  
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Introduction 
Relatively low and volatile agricultural 
commodity prices have placed 
increasing pressure on the state’s farm 
sector in the 1990s.  At the same time, 
an unusually robust non-farm economy 
has generated significant demand for 
rural housing and recreational land 
development.  The result has been a 
dramatic acceleration in the rate of 
farmland conversion to non-farm uses 
over the last 15 years. 
 
Non-farm growth pressures have 
affected many other aspects of 
Wisconsin’s urban and rural landscape 
as well.  To help communities grapple 
with these new challenges, the state 
legislature passed a new “Smart 
Growth” law in the fall of 1999 (1999 
Wisconsin Act 9).  This law encourages 
municipalities to write and use new 
“comprehensive plans” to guide all their 
land use decisions by January 1, 2010.  
Under the statute, one required element 
of comprehensive plans will be an 
assessment of agricultural resources and 
a plan for their future use or protection. 
 
This article assesses the significance of 
the new Smart Growth legislation for 
agriculture in Wisconsin.  I begin with 
an overview of trends in farmland loss in 
the state.  Because agricultural planning 
had a long history in the state even 
before the Smart Growth law, I examine 
some of the political and economic 
challenges of writing and implementing 
effective land use plans in rural 
communities.  I conclude with a detailed 
consideration of what the Smart Growth 
law will require concerning agriculture, 
and explore some of the ways in which it 
could impact farms, the general 
agribusiness economy, land markets, and 
rural communities in Wisconsin. 
 
Farmland Losses in Wisconsin 
Wisconsin has long been one of the 
nation’s most important agricultural 
states.  It currently ranks in the top 10 in 
the number of commercial-scale farms, 
production of milk, acres of corn and 
hay, and net cash income from farming 
(USDA, 1999a).  Despite the continued 
importance of agriculture to its economy 
and rural communities, Wisconsin’s 
farm sector has been in a state of decline 
since the early 1980s.  Between 1982 
and 1997 overall farm numbers have 
fallen by 20 percent, and the number of 
dairy farms has fallen by almost half 
(Buttel, 1999).  While declines in farm 
numbers have been a long-term 
historical trend in the state, increases in 
productivity and expansion among the 
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remaining farms are no longer adequate 
to compensate for these losses.  As a 
result, the value of total gross farm sales 
(adjusted for inflation), volume of milk 
production, and acres used for farming 
have all either stagnated or declined over 
the last 15-20 years (USDA, 1999a; 
Jackson-Smith, 1996; Jackson-Smith and 
Barham, 2000). 
 
Meanwhile, during the 1990s there has 
been a steady and almost unprecedented 
period of economic growth and 
prosperity in Wisconsin’s non-farm 
sector.  Real wages and personal income 
have increased, unemployment rates are 
among the nation’s lowest, and 
population and housing growth have 
been particularly high surrounding many 
of the state’s urban centers (WDOC, 
1998). 
 
The combination of a depressed farm 
economy and a vibrant non-farm sector 
has placed pressure on landowners to 
convert farmland to other uses.   
 
Generally speaking, non-farm 
development can negatively impact the 
viability of commercial farms in many 
ways.  Certainly, non-farm residents 
living in close proximity to working 
farms can increase nuisance, trespass, 
and vandalism complaints.  Increased 
traffic problems can result from 
commuters sharing the road with 
agricultural machinery.  As land gets 
split into smaller parcels, remaining 
farmers are forced to deal with more 
landlords and travel longer distances to 
access rented fields.  Increased demand 
for public services associated with non-
farm development can also drive up 
local property tax rates and make it 
increasingly costly for farmers to 
continue to own land.5  Perhaps most 
important for the long-run health of the 
farm sector, non-farm demand usually 
causes farmland values to soar far above 
their value as agricultural resources and 
thus make it virtually impossible for 
young people to afford to buy a farm of 
their own. 
 
From a farmer’s perspective, however, 
the inflated land value associated with 
development pressure is a double-edged 
sword.  Certainly high land prices make 
it more difficult to enter farming or 
expand existing farms.  However, 
appreciated land values also enable older 
or exiting farmers to realize larger 
financial gains when they sell their 
farmland assets.  Proceeds from selling 
farmland are often the only source of 
retirement funds for older farm families. 
 
Rates of Farmland Loss in Wisconsin 
 
Although most observers agree that there 
has been a significant decline in the 
amount of Wisconsin land used for 
farming over the last 20 years, precise 
estimates of the magnitude of that 
decline differ somewhat.  Table 9 
presents a number of different estimates 
of the acres of farmland in Wisconsin for 
selected years between 1978 and 1997.   
 
The most complete inventory of farming 
operations is conducted every 5 years 
through the U.S. Census of Agriculture.  
Census data are collected from all farms 
in the state that produced or sold goods 
worth at least $1,000 in the Census year.  
Census estimates suggest that the state 
                                                 
5 It should be noted, however, that recent 
implementation of a Use Value Assessment law 
for farmland should buffer the impact of 
development-induced rising property taxes on 
farmland owners (Sheil, 1996).  
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lost almost 3 million acres (or roughly 
16 percent) of farmland between 1978 
and 1997.  It is worth noting that the 
“farmland” reported in the periodic 
Census of Agriculture includes a 
considerable amount of land on which 
crops were not harvested (roughly  
42 percent of the total).  Because the 
Census includes all land that is part of a 
Wisconsin farm operation, a good 
fraction consists of woodland or 
permanent pastureland that is 
interspersed within a diversified farm 
operation.  Hence, while annual 
farmland losses reported in the Census 
ranged from 125,000-229,000 acres per 
year, losses of harvested cropland – the 
kind of land that springs to mind when 
most people imagine the process of 
farmland conversion – were in the range 
of 44,000-106,000 acres per year 
(USDA, 1999).   
 
Using different methods, the Wisconsin 
Agricultural Statistics Service 
consistently reports somewhat higher 
total farmland acreages for the state than 
does the Census (WASS, 2000).  
Because WASS also finds somewhat 
slower annual and total net losses, the 
gap between the two estimates appears 
to be increasing over time.  Both Census 
and WASS estimated that roughly 
100,000 acres of farmland were taken 
out of production each year during the 
mid- to late-1990s. 
 
While Census and WASS statistics 
suggest that high farmland loss rates 
have been with us for at least the last 20 
Table 9:  Estimated Acres of Farmland In Wisconsin, 1978-1997 
  
Farmland 
(Census)1 
Harvested 
Cropland 
(Census)2 
Farmland 
(WASS)3 
Land Taxed as 
Farmland  
(WI-DOR)4 
Acres of Farmland     
1978 17,838,982 10,062,154 18,800,000 n.a. 
1982 17,234,127 9,863,051 18,500,000 n.a. 
1987 16,606,567 9,335,007 17,700,000 15,289,791 
1992 15,463,551 8,843,649 17,300,000 14,809,872 
1997 14,900,205 8,625,011 16,800,000 14,167,746 
Annualized Net 
Loss     
1978-1982 -151,214 -49,776 -75,000 n.a. 
1982-1987 -125,512 -105,609 -160,000 n.a. 
1987-1992 -228,603 -98,272 -80,000 -95,983 
1992-1997 -112,669 -43,728 -100,000 -128,425 
NOTES: 
1Census of Agriculture, various years.  Includes all farmland 
operated. 
2Census of Agriculture, various years.  Includes only harvested 
cropland acres. 
 3Wisconsin Agricultural Statistics Service estimates, various years. 
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years, estimates from the state 
Department of Revenue indicate a 
notable acceleration in the sale and 
conversion of farmland in the last  
5-10 years.  The final column in Table 8 
reflects the total acreage in Wisconsin 
that is determined by local property tax 
assessors to be in agricultural use.  These 
tax records suggest that farmland loss 
between 1992-1997 increased by  
34 percent over the previous 5-year 
period.  Although not shown on Table 9, 
reports of Wisconsin farmland sales 
(WASS, 2000) suggest that over 75,000 
acres of agricultural land were sold and 
converted to non-farm uses each year 
between 1993-1997.  This represents 
nearly three times as many acres as were 
reported sold and converted between 
1983-1987 (and 20 percent more than 
between 1988-1992). 
 
Overall, there has been a growing public 
concern that Wisconsin is at risk of 
permanently losing some of its best 
agricultural soils to pressure from both 
urban sprawl and rural recreational land 
development.  These discussions have 
been highlighted by the release of a 
recent national study by the American 
Farmland Trust that identified the 
southeastern quarter of the state as the 
third most threatened agricultural area in 
the country (Sorenson et al., 1997). 
 
Where does all that farmland go? 
 
While significant amounts of cropland 
and pasture are withdrawn from 
agricultural production each year, it is 
not obvious what this farmland is being 
used for after conversion.  Data from the 
USDA National Resource Inventory 
(USDA, 1999b) suggest that 
urbanization is now responsible for the 
majority of farmland converted (See 
Figure 25).  In this context, urbanization 
refers to both “hard urbanization” 
involving the construction of relatively 
densely clustered residential homes or 
other commercial and industrial uses, as 
well as “rural” urbanization involving 
less densely packed rural residential 
properties.  In addition, a good deal of 
farmland has grown up in loosely 
managed forests and grasslands.  This 
suggests that efforts to slow the overall 
conversion of farmland in the state will 
need to address both near-urban sprawl 
as well as the more diffuse process of 
rural residential and recreational land 
development. 
 
Challenges of Agricultural and Rural 
Planning 
 
Agricultural Planning in Wisconsin 
 
The recently passed Smart Growth law is 
certainly not the first time that 
Wisconsin state and local governments 
have attempted to develop plans to 
protect farmland from development.  
Since the 1970s, Wisconsin has had a 
strong reputation as a national leader in 
programs designed to protect farmland 
(Daniels and Bowers, 1997).  The state 
initially adopted a comprehensive 
Farmland Preservation Program (FPP) in 
1977, which included two 
complementary approaches to protect 
prime agricultural soils from non-farm 
development (Barrows and Yanggen, 
1978).   
 
The first approach provides direct tax 
relief to farmers.  This is done through 
an income tax credit program that offers 
credits on state income taxes to farmers 
who agree to enroll their farmland in the 
FPP program.  Enrollees must refrain 
from selling or converting their land to 
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non-farm uses.  Along with the tax 
credits, the state FPP also provides 
incentives for local governments to 
adopt agricultural land use plans and 
exclusive agricultural zoning (EAZ) 
ordinances (Runde, 1999).  The general 
idea is to use tax credits to attract 
interest in a process of more general land 
use planning in rural places, with a 
particular emphasis on identifying 
important agricultural resource areas and 
protecting them from future 
development.  In order to qualify for the 
tax credits at all, farmers had to live in a 
county that had an agricultural land use 
plan.  As a result, by the early 1980s 
virtually every county had adopted a 
plan that met the standards of the statute 
(Emelock, 1989).  In addition, to receive 
full credits under the tax relief 
provisions, farmers have to live in a 
town that has adopted an exclusive 
agricultural zoning ordinance (or at least 
recognized and functioned under a 
county EAZ ordinance).  
 
Because of the FPP incentives, many 
town governments now have adopted 
land use plans (Ohm and Schmidtke, 
1999) and EAZ ordinances.  A review of 
state records suggests that almost  
70 percent of towns now operate under 
some type of general zoning ordinance, 
and over 40 percent of towns enforce 
specific EAZ ordinances, either 
themselves, or through their county.  The 
most active counties and towns have 
periodically revised their land use plans 
and ordinances to conform to shifting 
community priorities and concerns.  
Others still operate under the terms of 
their original plans, most of which were 
adopted between 1979 and 1981. 
The Social Context of Agricultural 
Planning 
 
It is worth noting that maintenance of 
agriculture – particularly commercial 
scale farms – is typically a central goal 
of most town land use plans in 
Wisconsin.  Indeed, statewide polls 
show that the overwhelming majority of 
Wisconsin residents are committed to 
the idea that protecting farming and 
agricultural landscapes is a top land use 
planning priority (On Common Ground, 
1999).   
 
However, attendance at any town board 
meeting quickly reveals an interesting 
irony of the local land use decision-
making process.  In most public forums, 
it is often the non-farm residents (many 
of whom recently moved to their rural 
homes) that are the most ardent 
supporters of policies discouraging 
farmland conversion, while the older 
farmers who attend such meetings 
frequently seek to preserve their rights to 
sell their lands however they see fit as 
they plan for their own retirements.  In 
essence, a traditional rural ethic 
respecting individual property rights and 
the “independence” of family farmer 
decision-making has begun to conflict 
with a growing public and private 
interest in regulating the impacts of farm 
landowner decisions on the quality of 
life in the community as a whole. 
 
To be fair, the interests and priorities of 
“farmers” are usually much more 
complex.  Surveys have shown that the 
farm community as a whole is quite 
sympathetic to the idea that some 
restrictions should be placed on the pace 
and type of development that occurs in 
their communities (Jackson-Smith, 
2000).  However, a sizeable majority of 
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farmers also think that farmers should be 
compensated for agreeing to limit their 
options to sell land as they see fit.  
Moreover, surveys and informal 
conversations reveal that nearly all 
Wisconsin farmers have a desire to see 
farming continue on their land after they 
retire – if they thought it could be done 
profitably.   
 
Farmer views are also affected by the 
age of the farm operator and the type of 
farm they operate.  While older farmers 
have a deep interest in protecting the 
value of their land investments, younger 
and mid-career farmers recognize that 
higher land prices can adversely impact 
the viability of their own farms.  Large 
commercial farmers – who have made 
investments in the future of their 
industry – tend to be more supportive of 
restrictions on development than do 
operators of part-time or sub-commercial 
farms. 
 
Non-farmers also represent a much more 
heterogeneous group than they are often 
given credit for.  While an increasing 
number of rural citizens have decidedly 
urban backgrounds, the vast majority of 
Wisconsin’s non-farm rural residents are 
long-term residents who have personal 
ties to the farm sector.  As a result, they 
frequently share the same cultural values 
and political viewpoints as their farming 
neighbors, and also express conflicting 
views about the necessity of community 
regulation of local land use decisions. 
 
Lessons learned from 20 years of 
Farmland Preservation Planning in 
Wisconsin 
 
Wisconsin’s Farmland Preservation 
Program has been specifically criticized 
on a number of grounds.  Initially, to 
gain political support for the program, 
farmers in every county across the state 
were made eligible for tax relief, 
spreading a limited total amount of 
public investment across a relatively 
large number of potential recip ients.  
This lack of targeting makes fewer 
dollars available in the regions where the 
threats to agricultural land are greatest.  
More importantly, the original per acre 
tax relief benefits have not been indexed 
to inflation.  As a result, the value of the 
credit is increasingly small relative to the 
financial rewards gained from selling the 
land for development.  Indeed, in most 
of the urbanizing and near-urban 
counties in Wisconsin the net benefits of 
converting farmland to non-farm uses 
may exceed the annual value of the FPP 
credit by ten to twenty times or more.  
The recent move towards use value 
assessment of farmland is likely to 
further decrease the tax credit benefits.  
Finally, FPP payback provisions have 
not served as much of a disincentive for 
pulling land out of the program. 
 
Given the limitations of tax-credit 
programs to saving farmland, local 
municipalities have increasingly relied 
on the use of regulatory approaches to 
prevent unwanted development and to 
protect agricultural and natural 
resources.  Typically these regulatory 
programs involve some combination of 
land use planning and zoning.  Indeed, 
most Wisconsin town or county board 
meetings in the last five years have been 
dominated by citizen requests to divide 
or rezone agricultural lands for the 
purposes of single home development.  
In most cases, it is the local land use 
plans, combined with building permit, 
land division, and zoning ordinances, 
that provide guidance to those who must 
make decisions on these requests. 
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In principle, planning and zoning should 
provide a firm line of defense for the 
preservation of farmland.  Communities 
identifying farmland preservation as a 
goal can (and usually do) establish 
restrictive “agricultural zones” that 
prohibit most residential or non-
agricultural commercial development.  
Assuming that these ordinances are 
rigorously enforced – i.e., that waivers, 
variances, or rezoning are rare – it is 
likely that there will be noticeably less 
development on protected agricultural 
lands. 
 
In practice, two sorts of problems are 
often encountered with planning and 
zoning for agriculture.  First, though 
land use plans may state that 
preservation of agricultural lands is a top 
priority, local government officials may 
find it difficult to turn down all 
development proposals that would 
infringe upon agricultural property.  This 
is particularly true in rural areas when 
the farmland owner is a former 
commercial farmer with few retirement 
savings, and someone who has been a 
longtime resident of the area with close 
ties to the local officials.  Many 
farmland preservation plans are also 
written without a full consideration of 
the complexity associated with 
enforcement or implementation, 
particularly when planning is done 
simply to meet state or federal 
requirements.  In such cases the plan 
may not be used as a binding document 
for making land use decisions.  
 
A second potential problem with rural 
and agricultural planning and zoning is 
reflected in the conventional practice of 
large- lot zoning to protect farming and 
other natural resources.  In Wisconsin, 
for example, state law has required 
minimum lot sizes of at least 35 acres in 
order for property to be zoned for 
“exclusive agriculture” and hence to 
receive maximum income tax credit 
benefits.  The logic behind large- lot 
zoning is that 35 or 40-acre parcels will 
be unattractive to non-farm rural 
homebuyers, and that these large parcels 
have the potential to be viable 
agricultural units.  In addition, large lot 
sizes help maintain relatively low overall 
population density and also preclude 
unwanted concentrations of new houses 
in a confined area. 
 
After twenty to thirty years of 
experience, large- lot zoning approaches 
have been roundly criticized on a 
number of grounds.  Initially, it is clear 
that modern agriculture requires 
significantly more acres, often upwards 
of 300-400 acres per farm, than typical 
minimum lot sizes allow to be 
economically viable.6  Moreover, it has 
been shown that 35-40 acre parcels are 
still quite attractive to non-farm 
residents seeking to build a home in the 
country, particularly where rural land 
prices are low compared to prices for 
lots within or on the margins of urban 
areas.  In Wisconsin, “the 35-acre rule” 
associated with the FPP-EAZ statute has 
encouraged many municipalities to 
approve a significant number of rural 
residential homes on relatively large lots.  
In aggregate, it is likely that significantly 
more farmland acreage has been 
withdrawn from agriculture – in large 35 
or 40 acre chunks – because of the large 
                                                 
6 Of course, some types of high-value, low-
acreage agriculture (like market gardening, 
greenhouses, and horticultural operations) can be 
viable on much less than 35 acres, but these are 
usually economically and numerically much less 
significant than traditional farm commodity 
producers. 
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minimum lot size requirement than 
would have been the case if the law had 
allowed a similar number of 
developments but permitted them on 
smaller parcels.  Even when non-farm 
landowners choose to rent out their 
excess farmland, parcelization of the 
landscape in the long run makes farming 
more difficult and impractical for the 
remaining commercial farm operators. 
 
Along with passing the Smart Growth 
law, recent changes in state statutes also 
removed the 35-acre criteria traditionally 
associated with EA zoning.  After 
January 1, 2001 a municipality can 
decide to have any sized lot in an EA 
zone.  However, this change will still not 
permit landowners in EAZ areas to do 
anything with their land that may be 
incompatible with surrounding 
agricultural uses.  Moreover, to qualify 
for receiving tax credits under the FPP, a 
landowner will have to have at least 35 
acres in their parcel. 
 
A recent statistical analysis of spatial 
patterns of farmland loss suggest that the 
Wisconsin Farmland Preservation 
Program (FPP) income tax credits have 
produced some of their intended benefits 
(Jackson-Smith and Bukovac, 2000).  
Overall, the rate of conversion was 
lower in towns where more people had 
enrolled farmland acreage in the FPP 
and claimed it on their taxes.  Moreover, 
the benefits from FPP income tax credits 
are most clear in towns that have dense 
populations already and that face the 
highest rates of housing development.  
Meanwhile, the presence or absence of 
general zoning or exclusive agricultural 
zoning ordinances in Wisconsin towns 
did not appear to be systematically 
related to the pace of farmland 
conversion. 
That does not necessarily mean that 
planning or zoning cannot be useful 
tools in the effort to save farmland.  
Indeed, the results of a parallel in-depth 
study of farmland losses in Dane County 
suggest that strong local land use plans 
and ordinances are a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for an effective 
farmland preservation policy (Bukovac, 
1999).  In particular, the most important 
factor influencing a town’s ability to 
slow farmland loss is its willingness to 
strictly enforce the language in their 
plans and ordinances.   Towns with 
relatively strong farmland protection 
language in their land use plans, but who 
frequently approved rezoning proposals 
that were inconsistent with their stated 
policies typically lost farmland much 
more rapidly.  Meanwhile, towns with 
relatively modest plan language, but who 
were able to muster the political will to 
consistently deny requests for 
development that violated farmland 
protection provisions fared relative ly 
well.  Those with no plans or ordinances 
tended to consistently lose farmland 
rapidly, though not necessarily faster 
than those failing to enforce their local 
plans. 
 
 
Wisconsin’s New Smart Growth Law 
 
The passage of Wisconsin’s “Smart 
Growth” statute in the fall of 1999 
provides both a structured framework 
and a new opportunity for all Wisconsin 
communities to engage in agricultural 
planning.  The “Smart Growth” title of 
the law comes from the observation that 
many past planning and zoning activities 
have promoted patterns of residential 
and commercial development that 
consume large amounts of land, increase 
fiscal stress on communities, and 
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otherwise adversely affect the quality of 
life in the state by creating eyesores, 
traffic problems, and damaging natural 
resources.  The basic principles of smart 
growth include reinvigorating 
development within urban areas, 
reducing the average lot size of housing 
development, protecting natural 
resources, and encouraging development 
along existing (or planned) 
transportation corridors.  Many states 
and municipalities have embraced smart 
growth principles across the United 
States in recent years. 
 
From agriculture’s point of view, the 
new statute does a number of key things.  
First, it provides a legal definition of a 
comprehensive plan. These plans are 
“comprehensive” mainly because they 
simultaneously cover the full range of 
topics that traditionally have been the 
focus of disconnected planning efforts.  
Specifically, agricultural planning will 
increasingly be integrated into other 
related planning activities like housing, 
environmental, and economic 
development planning.  Second, the law 
requires a more explicit public 
participation process during plan 
development and plan implementation.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if 
a local municipality wants to make any 
kind of decision that affects land use, the 
law requires that by January 1, 2010 they 
must adopt a legal comprehensive plan 
and ensure that all their other land use 
decisions are consistent with that plan.  
The legislation provides some financial 
assistance to local municipalities (in 
terms of planning grants) and includes 
provisions for paying incentives – or 
“smart growth dividend aids” – to 
communities that have successfully 
adopted comprehensive plans meeting 
certain basic standards. 
To meet the requirements of the statute, 
comprehensive plans will have to 
include at least 9 key elements: 
 
a) Issues and opportunities  
b) Housing  
c) Transportation  
d) Utilities and community facilities  
e) Agricultural, natural and cultural 
resources  
f) Economic development  
g) Intergovernmental cooperation  
h) Land use  
i) Implementation  
 
Since agricultural land represents the 
dominant land use for the majority of 
Wisconsin towns and counties – and 
because most residential and commercial 
development is likely to occur on 
agricultural land – it is likely that the 
Smart Growth legislation will initiate a 
new round of agricultural planning 
activity in the state.  Agriculture is 
specifically mentioned in the fifth 
required element, which requires: 
 
“A compilation of objectives, 
policies, goals, maps and 
programs for the conservation, 
and promotion of the effective 
management, of natural resources 
such as groundwater, forests, 
productive agricultural areas, 
environmentally sensitive areas, 
threatened and endangered 
species, stream corridors, surface 
water, floodplains, wetlands, 
wildlife habitat, metallic and 
nonmetallic mineral resources, 
parks, open spaces, historical and 
cultural resources, community 
design, recreational resources 
and other natural resources.”   
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Although the FPP encouraged most 
counties and many towns to develop 
agriculturally oriented land use plans, 
the new Smart Growth law will probably 
require these same municipalities to 
revisit their plans and policies.  In fact, it 
is likely that many municipalities will 
seek to adopt a new comprehensive plan 
that also meets the requirements of 
agricultural planning provisions of the 
original Farmland Preservation statutes.  
At the same time, many communities 
will be thinking through their 
agricultural planning and policies for the 
first time.   
 
In both cases, the biggest change 
resulting from the new law is the fact 
that new comprehensive plans will 
eventually become legally binding 
documents that have to be used as the 
basis for all future land use decisions.  
This is a dramatic departure from past 
practices, where agricultural plans were 
often seen as general guidelines with 
little real enforcement power, and even 
sometimes forgotten or ignored outright.  
 
Typically an agricultural planning 
process will go through several key 
steps: (i) conducting an analysis of 
recent agricultural trends and the current 
situation; (ii) identifying a set of goals 
and objectives that reflect community 
and individual values regarding the 
future use of agricultural land; (iii) 
developing policies that help guide 
future land use decisions; and (iv) 
writing “implementation tools” – such as 
zoning ordinances, land division and 
subdivision ordinances, driveway and 
building permit procedures, and other 
local regulations. 
While agricultural planning is a required 
subcomponent of just one of the nine 
elements in a Smart Growth 
comprehensive plan, in most places 
agriculture is likely to permeate many 
other aspects of a well-written plan.  For 
example, any assessment of the “issues 
and opportunities” in a rural agricultural 
community is likely to engage the debate 
over protecting farmers and farmland 
from non-farm development.  Moreover, 
the subcomponents of comprehensive 
plans that address the protection of local 
natural resources will inevitably need to 
consider farm issues, since agricultural 
land use has significant impacts on the 
environment.  In a different sense, the 
economic development plan element in 
many communities may well explore 
ways that local municipalitie s can 
facilitate farm modernization, local 
value-added farm commodity 
processing, and creation of new markets 
for local agricultural products.  Since 
housing development on farm fields 
appears to be a primary land use concern 
in most parts of rural Wiscons in, any 
successful housing plan element will 
need to address how an affordable and 
adequate supply of housing can be 
provided while still protecting 
agricultural resources.  Finally, because 
agricultural lands are at the center of 
many land use and intergovernmental 
squabbles, agriculture is likely to be a 
prominent component of the required 
land use and intergovernmental elements 
of Smart Growth plans. 
 
It is clear that the Smart Growth law will 
generate a significant new round of 
agricultural planning in Wisconsin.  
However, it is not clear that 
communities are well equipped to meet 
the challenges discussed above.  Most 
rural towns and many rural counties rely 
on citizen volunteers and lack detailed 
information about the status of farming 
and direction of agricultural change in 
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their area.  Even when they identify 
agriculture as something they want to 
protect, it is likely that they will need 
new and better information to help them 
clarify their goals and evaluate different 
policy approaches to protecting farmers 
and farmland.  Given the limited 
successes associated with agricultural 
planning in the past, new data and 
information, better and more realistic 
land use policies, and support from both 
the public and private sector are critical 
to future efforts.  The greatest challenge 
will be to devise agricultural planning 
approaches that balance the interests of 
individual farmland owners on the one 
hand, and those of their neighbors and 
the community as a whole on the other.  
Since comprehensive planning does not 
require any specific kind of goal or 
policy (all it requires is that certain 
issues get examined and considered, it is 
likely that each community will want to 
find its own “comfort-zone” that reflects 
its own situation and unique mix of 
values and beliefs. 
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Wisconsin has been experiencing a 
sustained period of economic growth.  In 
the 21-year period between 1977 and 
1998 (the most current year reported), 
personal income grew by 313 percent in 
Wisconsin.  This growth level compares 
favorably to the Eastern Plain States 
(Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and Illinois), 
where personal income grew by  
320 percent, and the Western Plain 
States (Minnesota, Iowa, and the 
Dakotas), which grew by 274 percent.  A 
similar pattern emerges when examining 
Gross State Product (GSP).  Wisconsin’s 
GSP grew by 286 percent between 1977 
and 1998 while the Eastern and Western 
Plain States grew by 288 percent and 
254 percent respectively.  While the 
recession of the early 1980s was 
particularly hard on Wisconsin, the most 
recent recession of the early 1990s was 
barely felt in most of Wisconsin.  
Although there have been recent 
concerns about the quality of the jobs 
being created in this period of economic 
growth, in particular wage levels, the 
Wisconsin economy has been growing 
as strong if not stronger than 
neighboring states. 
 
The agricultural economy, unfortunately, 
has not experienced the same level of 
prosperity over the past 20-plus years.  
Farm income historically has been 
volatile, subject to constantly changing 
domestic and foreign farm policies, 
weather, and structural changes within 
the industry itself.  This volatility is 
clearly evident when examining growth 
patterns for farm income and farm gross 
state product over the past twenty years.    
 
Based on a simple five-period moving 
average, gross state product from farms 
grew by about 25 percent from 1977 to 
now, a growth rate which is significantly 
slower than Wisconsin’s overall 
economic growth.  Again using a simple 
five period moving average, personal 
income attributed to farming, however, 
experienced more than a 25 percent 
decline.  When directly comparing the 
overall growth in Wisconsin total 
personal income to farm-related personal 
income (Figure 26), a disturbing picture 
becomes readily apparent: Wisconsin’s 
farming economy has not taken part in 
state’s broader economic growth.  In 
other words, although farm output in 
Wisconsin is growing modestly, farm 
income is declining. 
 
The fact that net farm income has been 
declining as total farm output has been 
increasing is evidence that farm profit 
margins are narrowing over time.  In the 
early 1980s the average profit margin for 
Wisconsin farmers was around  
25 percent; allowing farmers to earn 
roughly 25 cents of profits per dollar of 
output.  Farm profit margins in recent 
years have fallen to roughly 15 percent. 
This 10-cent decline in the profits 
farmers earn per dollar of total output is 
the result of falling output prices and 
rising input costs. 
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The erosion of farm profit margins is an 
outcome of the competitive forces that 
are at work in agriculture.  Farmers 
attempting to survive in the industry are 
simultaneously paying higher prices for 
inputs and boosting production in an 
attempt to raise or maintain their 
incomes.  This increase in farm 
production puts downward pressures on 
farm commodity prices, which 
ultimately translates into even narrower 
farm profit margins. 
 
The narrow profit margins that currently 
exist in farming are too low to sustain all 
the farm businesses that are currently 
operating in the state.  But farm exits are 
not likely to improve profit margins in 
the near term.  Farmers who remain in 
business will acquire the land, cows, and 
other assets of exiting farmers and then 
use these assets to maintain output.  The 
margins earned on this output will 
continue to be low, but sufficient to 
support those farms that produce large 
volumes of output.  This movement to 
large-scale farming will likely continue 
as long as margins remain tight. 
 
In addition to gross state product (i.e., 
net value added) and farmers’ income 
(i.e., personal income), a common 
measure of industry growth is the 
number of firms, or proprietors, in 
operation.  As noted in Figure 27, 
between 1977 and 1998 the number of 
non-farm proprietors increased by about 
63 percent.  The number of farm 
proprietors, however, declined by about 
19 percent.7  
                                                 
7 This reported decline in farm numbers masks 
larger declines in the number of farms for which 
farming is the principal source of income.  In 
recent years, farm numbers have actually 
increased, as rural more residences have 
Increasing farm sales coupled with a 
declining number of farm 
proprietorships is a reflection of the 
consolidation that is occurring in 
farming not only in Wisconsin, but also 
across the nation.  The Eastern Plain 
States experienced about a 25 percent 
decline in the number of farm 
proprietors while the Western Plain 
States experienced a 23 percent decline.  
Declining farm numbers coupled with 
increased farm sales, unfortunately, does 
not necessarily translate into higher per 
proprietor income.  For Wisconsin farm 
proprietors, the five-year average per 
proprietor income between 1977 and 
1981 was $13,400 but only $8,100 for 
the five-year average between 1994 and 
1998.  If one adjusts for the affects of 
inflation, the decline in per farm 
proprietor income is even more 
pronounced. 
 
The low proprietary incomes reported 
for Wisconsin farmers suggest that many 
farm households need other sources of 
income.  According to USDA, roughly 
87 percent of farm household income for 
farms in the Lake States region (which 
includes Wisconsin) was from non-farm 
sources in 1995.8  This heavy 
dependence of farm households on non-
farm income is not surprising in light of 
the fact that average farm earnings are 
well below the U.S. average household 
income, which was reported at roughly 
$45,000 in the 1995 Current Population 
Survey of the Bureau of the Census. 
 
                                                                   
technically become “farms” because sales 
exceeded definitional standards. 
8 Structural and Financial Characteristics of 
U.S. Farms, 1995: 20th Annual Family Farm 
Report to the Congress (December 1998) 
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The 1997 Census of Agriculture 
provides additional evidence that 
Wisconsin farm households are 
increasingly relying on non-farm income 
to supplement low farm incomes.  
Census data show that almost 40 percent 
of Wisconsin farms had operators 
working at least 200 days off their farms.   
 
If farm profit margins continue to be 
tight, smaller farm operators will be 
forced to seek off- farm employment if 
they intend to stay on their farms.  The 
extent to which these farmers are 
successful in gaining off- farm 
employment depends on the strength of 
Wisconsin non-farm economy.  A robust 
non-farm economy, such as we have 
seen in recent years, should give farmers 
good opportunities to get the off farm 
jobs they will be seeking.  Alternatively, 
a slow down in the non-farm economy 
could make it difficult for farmers to 
gain employment and earn the off- farm 
incomes they need to supplement their 
farm business earnings. 
 
An integral part of the Wisconsin 
agricultural economy is the processing 
sector, referred to as the food and 
kindred products industry.  For 
Wisconsin this includes cheese plants, 
vegetable canners and breweries, to 
name but a few.  For the period 1977 to 
1998, earnings from the agricultural 
processing sector increased by  
150 percent in Wisconsin, about  
158 percent for the Western Plain States 
and 117 percent for the Eastern Plain 
states.  Growth in industry output, or 
industry sales for agricultural 
processing, is about 150 percent for 
Wisconsin, 140 percent for the Eastern 
Plain States, but significantly higher in 
the Western Plain States, which showed 
a 250 percent increase.  The accelerated 
increase in the value of agricultural 
processing’s product relative to earnings 
in the Western Plain States is reflective 
of the vertical integration of certain key 
agricultural sectors such as the meat 
packing industry.  Serious concern has 
been expressed about the impact that 
such integration has had on the quality 
of jobs within the sector.  While the 
simple analysis presented here does not 
suggest such a concern is warranted for 
Wisconsin at this time, national trends 
magnified in the Western Plain States 
may point to future issues for 
Wisconsin’s agricultural economy. 
 
Comparing overall growth in earnings 
and gross state product for Wisconsin 
with growth in the farm production and 
agricultural processing sectors shows a 
clear pattern (Figures 28 and 29).  As the 
overall state economy continues to grow, 
the more moderate growth of 
agricultural processing and the 
stagnation of farm production is causing 
agriculture to contribute an increasingly 
smaller share to the overall economy.  In 
1977, farming contributed $1.9 billion to 
Wisconsin’s gross state product, or about 
4.6 percent of the total, and agricultural 
processing contributed $1.7 billion or 
4.2 percent.  In 1998, the most current 
year for which data are available, 
farming contributed $2.5 billion to gross 
state product or only 1.6 percent whereas 
agricultural processing added $4.3 
billion or 2.7 percent (Figure 30).  
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The key to preserving Wisconsin’s 
agricultural processing sector is in the 
maintenance or growth of the farm 
sector.  Food processors need access to 
raw agricultural products.  Where 
processors get those raw products 
depends on Wisconsin farmers.  If 
farmers can meet the needs of 
processors, processors will continue to 
do business in the state.  If Wisconsin 
farmers fail to meet the raw product 
needs of processors, then processors will 
scale back or shut down their Wisconsin 
operations.
 
 
A note on measures of economic activity 
 
This article uses the concept of Gross State Product (GSP) to permit an “apples to 
apples” comparison of farming and food processing with other sectors of the state’s 
economy.  According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the federal agency 
responsible for estimating GSP: 
 
GSP is the value added in production by the labor and 
property located in a state.  In concept, an industry’s GSP, 
referred to as its “value added,” is equivalent to its gross 
output (sales or receipts and other operating income, 
commodity taxes, and inventory change) minus its 
intermediate inputs (consumption of goods and services 
purchased from other U.S. industries or imported).  Thus, 
GSP is often considered as the state counterpart of the 
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP).  In practice, GSP 
estimates are measured as the sum of the distributions by 
industry and State of the components of gross domestic 
income – that is, the sum of the costs incurred and incomes 
earned in the production of GDP. 
 
GSP is not value of production or industry shipments, nor is it the same as other 
measures of value added (value of output less cost of goods sold).  For instance, cash 
receipts from Wisconsin farm marketings in 1998 were $6.1 billion.  This compares to 
GSP from farming of $2.5 billion.  The Census of Manufacturers shows the value of 
shipments for Wisconsin food processing firms in 1997 at $20.6 billion, 17.5 percent of 
the total value of shipments for all Wisconsin manufacturing industries.  The Census 
further showed value added by this sector in 1997 at $6.7 billion, 12 percent of the state 
total. In contrast, GSP from the food and kindred products sector was only $4.3 billion in 
1998. 
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Figure 26: Trends in Wisconsin Income 
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Figure 27: Trends in Number of Wisconsin Proprieters
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Figure 28: Trends in Wisconsin  Earnings
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Figure 29: Trends in Gross State Product
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
400.0
450.0
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
In
d
ex
, 1
97
7=
10
0
Non-Farm
Farm
Food and Kindred Products
 63
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiure 30: Distribution of Wisconsin Gross State Product
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